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 Following the post-World War II military tribunals, international criminal law has 
developed into a standard method of human rights enforcement that threatens intervention on 
behalf of a supranational moral authority. Today, international governing bodies often insist that 
international legal arbitration be an integral part of responding to situations of humanitarian 
crisis. Contemporary international courts have been created to adjudicate crimes that ostensibly 
concern international order as well as the human political community writ large. Although a 
seemingly apolitical adherence to positive law legitimizes this legal paradigm for the 
enforcement of universal human rights, defining when international jurisdiction should supersede 
domestic jurisdictions is an inherently political decision. It also has far reaching effects on the 
administration of international criminal law. To better understand the relationship between the 
politics of international criminal law and its practice, I conduct an empirical study of the 
philosophy of the state of exception through two case studies, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) situation in Northern Uganda. 
My study applies a general theoretical framework in each case to understand the logic of 
international criminal law and consider how political contingencies influence international legal 
institutions. I argue that because international criminal law represents an exception, its practice, 
institutions, and application rest on questionable philosophical terms. Because the ICTR and ICC 
intervene on an exceptional basis and use an exceptional form of law vis-à-vis the nation-state, 
international criminal law’s use, interpretation, and application in each case remains embedded 
in a political context with competing norms, interests, and actors. I present numerous examples 
in both cases that implicate the state of exception, bringing to light troubling aspects as to how 
international criminal law is applied, interpreted, and politically manipulated. The paper ends 
with a discussion of how each case study complicates notions of sovereignty, exception, and 





In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt (1964) issued a controversial criticism of 
Israel’s exercise of justice against Nazi bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann, but one argument in her 
defense came to epitomize the framework for the contemporary practice of international criminal 
law: “insofar as the victims were Jews, it was right and proper that a Jewish court should sit in 
judgment; but insofar as the crime was a crime against humanity, it needed an international 
tribunal to do justice to it” (Arendt 1964:269). Arendt viewed the physical destruction of Jews in 
Nazi Germany as not only concerning Jewish victims, but more so the human political body writ 
large. The exceptional nature of the Holocaust and Adolf Eichmann’s complicity in it put human 
dignity as a whole at stake, and to Arendt, an international court, not the state of Israel, had the 
moral authority to represent it in a court of law. Today, the categorical definition of ‘crime 
against humanity’ is a widely accepted criminal standard that has convicted numerous people in 
various international courts. Through these laws, legal institutions explicitly defend a sacred 
universal human community – a ‘humanity’ that is under threat by a ‘crime’ against it. The 
growing moral imperative to penalize these types of crimes has created a developing 
supranational legal paradigm that transcends the nation-state. However, not every crime is 
deemed an infringement on humanity, and understanding what criminal transgressions qualify 
and their appropriate legal recourse is an exercise in defining exceptional breaches in universal 
human norms. 
The abnormality of these crimes should be obvious – the large scale, systematic ethnic 
extermination in the Former-Yugoslavia in 1993 to 1995; the slaughter of almost a million 
Rwandans in 1994; almost fifty thousand dead as a result of racial pogroms in Darfur since 2005; 
the maiming, enslavement, and indiscriminate killings of Northern Ugandan civilians by the 
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Lord’s Resistance Army from 2003 to 2006. Not only do these events evoke an almost universal 
abhorrence that separates humanity from its enemy, but their existence threatens a widely 
accepted moral consensus (Feldman and Ticktin 2010:14). Few proponents of international 
human rights would claim these atrocities do not deserve even limited punitive measures, and 
herein lies the philosophical quandary of international criminal law. National legal systems have 
domestic laws to adjudicate such crimes, but the gravity of these events ostensibly concern all 
human communities. They are understood as transgressions of customary human behavior, and 
leaving the perpetrators of immense human suffering unaccountable to these universal norms 
risks the sacred moral relevance of ‘humanity.’ International criminal law is designed to enforce 
a universal standard of accountability beyond the nation-state through legal constitutionalism. 
However, because international jurisdictions are defined by crimes perceived as threatening to a 
human collective, international legal intervention becomes a political rather than legal matter. 
Although nation-states may not represent a broad collective human morality, defining when 
‘humanity’ is at stake as well as the crimes that threaten it in order to warrant international legal 
intervention is a contested, ambiguous, and politically construed process. The exceptional basis 
of international criminal law puts its legal constitutionalism in philosophically questionable 
terms. By what process are these “crimes” designated “against humanity” thus enabling a 
supranational legal authority to transcend the laws of the nation-state? How does law come to 
terms with its exceptional origins? 
The notion exception has been a subject of political theory since the early 20th century, 
yet it has only recently emerged as a recurring paradigm in political scholarship. Constitutional 
laws that allow for ‘martial law,’ ‘states of emergency,’ ‘states of siege’ or ‘emergency 
responses’ have historical roots as far back as the Roman Empire (Agamben 2005:11-21). 
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However, the emergence of decrees of ‘humanitarian emergencies,’ ‘crimes against humanity’ 
and other exceptional international conditions have revitalized this troubling governing concept 
with new sites of application. Early philosophical considerations of the exception centered on its 
pernicious use in state governance in legitimating violence on its own citizenry. International 
governing bodies have now taken up the language of exception and expanded its theoretical 
application in a supposed moral service. The field of humanitarian intervention has most notably 
been the site of new understandings and implications of the state of exception (Pandolfi and 
Didier 2010, Feldman and Ticktin 2010, Bornstein and Redfield 2011), but legal and 
anthropological studies of international criminal law have yet to apply its philosophical structure 
to better understand how international law is justified, applied, and negotiated in its surrounding 
context. This paper will argue that although international legal institutions are legitimated by an 
adherence to positive law, the international legal form protects and works through politically 
guided calculations of exception.1 The most notable evidence of this paradigm are the crimes 
under its jurisdiction – crimes of “serious concern to the international community” that threaten 
“international peace and order.” These categories of criminality are exceptional forms of law that 
define a supranational legal order. ‘Humanity’ is at risk, and international criminal law is 
championed by international governing bodies as the only legitimate institution that can 
represent it. 
For example, following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the United Nations portrayed the 
murder of almost a million Rwandan Tutsis and Hutus as the exception to the rule of 
international diplomacy. The sheer amount of human destruction and its perverse motivation was 
                                                 
1 The term “positive” is used herein to describe man-made, statutory legal orders that expressly regulate a specific 
determination of legality. A positivist legal interpretation does not extend beyond its written form. 
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against all understandings of human rights the United Nations (UN) represented, and given its 
previous reluctance for military intervention, this universal moral code was headed towards 
irrelevancy if the UN did not act. With the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), the exceptional circumstance of an internationally recognized genocide justified 
legal recourse. The tribunal’s inception is a product of the UN’s calculated necessity for action, 
but moreover, the ICTR as an institution encountered political limitations of its own that 
demanded exceptional manipulation of the law. From its establishment to its final verdicts, the 
ICTR was deeply influenced by its political context. The letter of law was embedded, 
necessitated, and interpreted around the exceptional nature of the Rwandan genocide. 
Following the legal experiment of the international ad-hoc tribunals of the 1990s, 
emerging case law paved the way for a permanent standing international court that would no 
longer operate at the biding of political interests. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the 
result of decades of debate and advocacy, yet it is still a product of political compromise. The 
ICC accepts the legitimacy of national sovereignty as the norm by virtue of its basis in treaty 
law, and as a result the logic of exception has only been further entrenched in international 
criminal law. When the ICC initiated its first ever investigation against the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in Northern Uganda in 2003, the Court manipulated its statutory laws to pursue a 
politically prudential legal intervention. Furthermore, the actions that followed formal 
investigations demonstrated that the practice of international criminal law is still beholden to 
international realpolitik. Although the ICC is an independent international body removed from 
the UN Security Council, state cooperation and support is the foundation for the Court’s legal 
operations. There were significant political trepidations surrounding the ICC’s unchecked 
jurisdiction on state parties, and an unpopular intervention or misstep would mean its demise. 
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The ICC’s political context demanded a degree of flexibility in applying the law, and legal 
interpretation was construed to the Court’s advantage using statutory protections of exception. 
Apparent in the cases of the ICTR and the ICC is that the practice of international 
criminal law is entrenched in politics by virtue of its exceptional basis. Both institutions are 
created and manipulated by the political context, and both examples of international legal 
intervention operate through methods of negotiation, flexibility, and necessity. More importantly, 
positive law justifies its own political manipulation, and understanding international criminal law 
merely through the statutory laws it applies overlooks the contingencies behind legal 
interpretation and application. What is in question is not what international legal institutions 
produce, but rather how these supranational institutions apply, interpret, and enforce the law in 
the first place. The letter of the law is separated from its application, and legal interpretations are 
not made in a political vacuum. Theoretical notions of the state of exception are essential to 
understanding the logic of legal application at an institutional level. Political valuations relative 
to the surrounding context affect how law is utilized and interpreted, and the exception is a 
valuable theoretical tool in understanding the logic behind international criminal law’s use in its 
institutional setting. 
This paper is an empirical study of the philosophy of the state of exception in 
international criminal through two case studies, the ICTR in Rwanda and the ICC situation in 
Northern Uganda. I will show through specific legal decisions, events, and conflicts in each case 
that international criminal law’s investigative, procedural, and jurisprudential elements follow a 
problematic logic that represents the state of exception. The ICTR and ICC intervene on an 
exceptional basis and use an exceptional form of law vis-à-vis the nation-state, and I argue that 
because of this philosophical basis, international criminal law’s use, interpretation, and 
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application is manipulated by the contested political context in which it is embedded in. 
Numerous examples in each case study will demonstrate that the philosophical foundation of 
exception on which international criminal law is founded allows for a political manipulation of 
international criminal law. Furthermore, I will also argue that these case studies complicate 
generalized understandings of sovereignty, decision, and necessity thereby informing a more 
empirically grounded theory of the state of exception. Each institution has its own idiosyncrasies 
and contexts, but it is through the lens of the state of exception that common themes, practices, 
and paradigms emerge.  
The two case studies are chosen due to their novelty to international legal practice – the 
ICTR as the first ad-hoc tribunal to adjudicate crimes of genocide and the ICC situation in 
Northern Uganda as the first investigation for the newly institutionalized permanent judicial 
body. Moreover, I spent the summer of 2013 studying genocide and international law in Kigali, 
Rwanda as a part of a field research seminar sponsored by the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, and the knowledge I acquired was immensely useful in researching this project. Part 
of that program was also spent in The Hague, Netherlands consulting with representatives of a 
number of international courts, and I have since been well acquainted with the practice, politics, 
and scholarship of international criminal law. Both of these case studies share similar historical 
circumstances, but it is their differences that give credence to the value of examining 
contingencies and contexts to discover more general patterns. Each case study’s differing 
circumstances further strengthen the novelty in applying the state of exception in studying 
international legal institutions. Political contingencies affect law’s ideally universal and impartial 
application, and using the theoretical perspective of states of exception makes this observation 
apparent. Before explaining each case, a thorough review of academic treatments of the state of 
10 
 
exception is essential. The theory of exception helps explain the empirical which in turn 
complicates and expands applied abstractions. However, I will first begin with a brief discussion 
of the contextual foundation to the state of exception’s importance in international criminal law. 
 
 
II. The State of Exception 
 Genocide has been a legal concept for over half a century, but beyond its legal definition 
there is something theoretically complex and politically sinister associated with its use in 
international criminal law. The crime of genocide is something extra-ordinary– an exception to 
the well-recognized universal human ethic of a basic respect for human dignity. Characterizing 
genocide and equally destructive acts of violence as “grave,” “serious,” or “threatening to 
international order” points to a more fundamental political element associated with the legal 
determinations of such events. They are exceptional, and in being so, their application is subject 
to a specific kind of political manipulation. 
 Following the genocidal violence in Rwanda from April to July of 1994, the United 
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994 that established the 
justification for and the preliminary structure of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNSC 955). Within the resolution, the Council 
not only affirmed evidence that “systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international 
humanitarian law” had occurred, but also laid out a rationale for a necessary exceptional 
response in the form of legal action. “Threats to international peace and security,” concerns of 
“national reconciliation,” and “ensuring that such violations are halted” are used to justify the 
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establishment of a court of law specifically designed for the Rwandan genocide (UNSC 955). 
Going beyond its acknowledgement that crimes of genocide have been committed, Resolution 
955 (1994) established the necessity for extra-ordinary punitive measures that mandate the 
adjudication of “serious violations of international humanitarian law.” This resolution is but one 
example of a more widespread paradigm governing international criminal law – the state of 
exception. Allusions to the principles of the exception, sovereign power, and decision are 
predominately displayed in the Security Council’s creation of the ICTR, but to fully understand 
what the implications of Resolution 955 are and how they affect the operation of the ICTR, a 
proper analytical understanding of the theory of the state of exception is required. 
 
The Exception 
 The exception implies the norm. For something to be exceptional means that it transcends 
a normal state affairs such that all customary responses respective to the norm no longer apply. 
Defining what is normal, then, is an exercise in delineating what is abnormal, sketching the 
boundaries of the norm through what it is not. In declaring an exception, it must first be 
demonstrated that the norm has been transcended by a state unquantifiable by conditions of 
normalcy, in turn defining its boundaries. Calculating a response, then, cannot involve pre-
established regulatory measures, since rule and order are designed to regulate the norm’s 
establishment. Exceptional situations are in reference to regulatory mechanisms that have come 
under threat or no longer apply, and because the norm has been transcended, responding to 
exceptional events requires taking action outside of a predetermined law and order. In doing so, 
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what is outside of the state of normalcy defines what it transcends, sketching the boundaries of 
order through the determination of its breach. 
 Along these lines of understanding, the exception can be treated in much the same way as 
a ban. Giorgio Agamben (1994) ontologically demonstrates, through understanding what it 
means to be banned, that the norm is not wholly negated in its transcendence (104-111). A ban 
on something forcibly places it outside of what it is banned from, but the exclusionary state that 
ensues is maintained by the order from which it was banned. The norm applies force to what it 
exiles, continually defining itself in opposition to the things in which it is not (Agamben 
1998:19-29). It orders the things which are excluded from order, places them outside of its 
purview while keeping what it bans in the regulatory schematic. An exception applies the same 
theoretical foundation to its corresponding rule. Exceptions are excluded from the rule yet 
continually referencing it in its transcendence. A state of exception is created and maintained by 
the order it is exceptional to, and it remains an exception through the application of the rule. For 
example, when the UN declares that a “crime against humanity” has occurred, the rule of 
humanity and its exception define each other. Order and rule defines, preserves, and perpetuates 
exceptions to itself. 
 The judicial framework is a rationalist ordering system like any other. Law is an exercise 
in defining and limiting the actions of someone or something under strictly defined regulations 
and norms (Schmitt 2005:20). It specifies the boundaries of action by codifying certain practices 
as exceeding societal rules. Ideally, every action is attached to and defined by a positive legal 
structure. Law’s mission is to calculate all possibilities within a framework that makes the 
corresponding legal determination of permissibility predictable and expected (Schmitt 2005:27). 
The legal form is the modern rationalistic vision of state governance, strictly limiting action by 
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independently applying a normative framework in all possible cases. However, within most 
contemporary governments that are controlled by the rule of law, there is almost always a 
positive legal rule of exception that allows for the law’s suspension. 
 A legal state of exception is a paradoxical phenomenon of law that has far reaching 
implications. Like every other legal stipulation, laws that grant a state of exception are limited by 
a set of conditions that apply to a specific course of events. Decreeing a state of exception – state 
of siege, martial law, or state of emergency – first requires determining the existence of a set of 
preconditions. The aspect of decision will be discussed in more depth later, but at its foundation, 
a legal state of exception is governed by a positive legal order that acts rationally and 
scientifically in reacting to conditions in reality (Schmitt 2005:30). However, law effectually 
suspends itself in defining a situation that is exceptional to the legal order. Granting something 
exceptional to law legally permits extralegal action. The legal determination in a state of 
exception creates a situation in which law does not apply. Within such a state, the acting 
authority is no longer subject to determinations of legality, legally protecting what would be 
illegal actions outside of the exception. In the example of Resolution 955, the legal protection of 
the sovereign national borders of Rwanda was legally suspended by virtue of the occurrence of a 
crime of genocide and the creation of the ICTR. 
 The state of exception is excluded from the legal order, in doing so creating a separation 
between the exception and the juridical norm (Agamben 2005:38).2 Law ends where the state of 
exception begins, creating a dichotomy between the actions inside the juridical norm and those 
                                                 
2 The term “juridical” is utilized throughout this work for two reasons. One, “juridical” specifically refers to the 
administration of law in general terms whereas “judicial” refers specifically to legal institutions and its actors. 
Secondly, “juridical” is used throughout the scholarly discussion on the state of exception, and I do not wish to 
corrupt the meaning of the theory discussed here by a change in terminology. 
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external to it. Inside the state of exception all actions are legal yet it is a void in which law is 
suspended. What constitutes actions within the exception, though, is external to the juridical 
order. For example, once the UN deems something a threat to international stability, its actions 
are no longer constrained by protections on state sovereignty. The state of exception operates in 
the realm of the political – a type of action with no normative restrictions that serve the interests 
of one group against another (Schmitt 2005:45). Opposite of the juridical, political actions are 
infinite in their possibilities and the product of the will of those that decide what action is 
appropriate at a given time. Carl Schmitt’s (2007) conception of the political is characterized by 
the free expression of power to preserve one entity’s existence against another (45). The political 
is a domain of power and repression that is controlled by the subjective and unrestrained 
determinations of an acting authority (Schmitt 2007:71).3 
 This sketch of the state of exception is a legal ordering of extralegal actions, a 
paradoxical void in which law creates its own demise. In the case of the ICTR, international 
humanitarian law effectually suspends and replaces international protections of Rwandan 
national sovereignty. What remains to be discussed is why this concept is useful in constitutional 
governments characterized by an objective rule of law that restricts unchecked political actions. 
It is the realm in which the will of those that have the authority to act within the state of 
exception excuse themselves from legality to appropriate the self-interested motives of political 
subversion. The state of exception is merely a tool of governance legitimated through law that 
protects and expands the authority of those that decide it (Schmitt 2005:9). The apolitical nature 
                                                 
3 Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political (1932) presents the friend-enemy distinction as the primary definition 
of the political. For Schmitt, once an enemy has been drawn as the figure of opposition to a specific group or entity, 
that entity has then made a strictly political determination. It is a decisive exercise of authority that is present during 
any possibility of conflict. This work will be drawn from selectively over the course of this paper, but Schmitt’s 
essential friend-enemy dichotomy will not be an explicit part of the theoretical understanding presented here. 
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of law is utilized as an instrument in the state of exception that in turn legitimizes and protects 




Although law defines the exception, “the sovereign is he who decides the exception” 
(Schmitt 2005:5). This famous statement from German political theorist and jurist Carl Schmitt 
(2005) sets up a fundamental link between power and law. Schmitt is discussing the problem of 
rebellion and insurrection at the time of writing his theoretical framework on the state of 
exception, and his views on authority and necessity are informed by his position as a counter-
revolutionary and supporter of presidential authority in the Weimar Republic.4 Schmitt argues 
that the rational foundation of law appropriates the state of exception to preserve and defend the 
legal order from revolution (1922:6). However, Schmitt places law at the bidding of a sovereign 
authority who ultimately decides when it is applied. The constitutionalist, utopian vision of the 
rule of law that eradicates irrational and capricious political authority in favor of a calculative 
and systematic procedure of objectivity still does negate the human element of decision. A 
forerunner of legal realist scholarship, Schmitt views the norm and law connected by a sovereign 
                                                 
4 Like Martin Heidegger, Schmitt’s work is often discredited due to his position in the Nazi Socialist Party. 
However, the context of his position is important and should not distract from debating the validity of his work. 
Before joining the Nazi Party in 1933, Carl Schmitt was a jurist involved in persuading German president Paul von 
Hindenburg to reject Adolf Hitler’s claim to chancellor and instituting marshal law to preserve the power of 
Hindenburg against the political threat of the Nazi Party. Schmitt, however, joined the party once Hitler’s rise to 
power became self-evident due to his control of the German legislature and eventually became a public defender of 
the German identity. Schmitt supported the right of presidential authority over the constitution, and his affiliation 
with the Nazi party is a direct product of his philosophical leanings. This paper, however, will deal with Schmitt’s 
conception of the state of exception, not his opinions on its normative value in state governance. See George 
Schwab’s introduction in the 2007 expanded edition to Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political. 
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decision dictating when the former exists so as to apply the latter (Schmitt 2005:9). The 
exception is an integral aspect of an authority’s power to apply law because he or she has the 
power to decide when the conditions on which the state of exception is justified in fact exist 
(Schmitt 2007:35). Specific questions regarding this conception of the decision will be discussed 
in more depth in the following section, but the principle concern is how the state of exception 
initially comes to be decided upon. 
The sovereign exception appropriates two forms of power, the primary one Schmitt 
describes as law-preserving (Schmitt 2005:12). Under threat of rebellion, Schmitt argues that the 
state has the right to suspend law to preserve its constitutional legitimacy. What Schmitt defines 
as a commissarial dictatorship, the sovereign creates a state of exception to exceed legal 
restrictions in order to subvert an impending threat (Schmitt 2005:12). It is a temporal 
emergency condition that aims to reestablish the norm by suspending it, and thus the law that 
protects a state of exception is often used as a tool to pursue the sovereign’s political interests 
(Agamben 2005:31). Therefore, the state of exception affirms the norm by transcending it 
temporarily in order to reassert its authority. All action from a sovereign power is permitted in 
the name of the legal order, yet actions within the exception are not regulated by the order that is 
being defended. This brings up a second related power of the exception, that of law-making. The 
void created in the legal order is an opportunity to expand law and transform areas in which the 
legal order is absent. Because the state of exception is encompassed by its legal permissibility, 
law is still in force without being applied (Agamben 2005:38). Yet, similar to the decision to 
constitute the exception, the legal order can take on a new state of normalcy vis-à-vis the 
sovereign. Emergency is characterized by temporal bedlam which can in turn become 
unexceptional depending on what the sovereign characterizes as normal. Agamben (2005) 
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attempts to discredit the legal character of the state of exception by asserting its complete 
separation from law (64). However, Agamben forgets that the exception is founded on conditions 
that are open to interpretation. The exception can become rule when the temporary becomes 
legislated as normal and when the actions within the state of exception are necessary to create 
and preserve order. Necessity, decided upon by the subjective interpretation of the sovereign, 
guides when the exception is no longer exceptional, creating order through normalcy defined 
anew. 
Furthermore, a state of exception can be a reflection of the inadequacies within the legal 
order. Since the sovereign is outside of the law in the form of his capacity to decide the 
exception, he need not be based in law to create it (Schmitt 2005:13). It is essentially a sovereign 
intervention on behalf of the rule of law. Order has a corresponding value that is tantamount in 
governance. It derives a specific authority from its formal and calculable regulation against 
breaches in social behavior, and thus it is reasonable to assume that those in power seek to 
establish it wherever possible (Agamben 2005:38). The exception is a tool in which regulation of 
the norm can be applied and enforced through legal decision. Power and order are both 
subordinate to each other, and the power vested in deciding the state of exception is grounded in 
its legal organization (Schmitt 2005:14). Likewise, because actions within the exception are not 
limited by law, new legal prescriptions can be created and enforced. The ICTR, for example, 
expands the reach of international criminal law by being the first international court to adjudicate 
crimes of genocide and creates new precedent. The sovereign authority that is in the position to 
decide the exception can ultimately decide its form, progression, and ultimately its termination. 
Agamben’s anarchist perspective largely assumes a malevolent sovereign bent on taking 
advantage of unrestricted political violence, and he refuses to grant that the legal form in general 
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is a derivative of application, practice, and decision that are fundamental to the state of exception 
(Schmitt 2005:27). 
Lastly, it is important to note that a state of exception is a product of the subjectively 
defined notion of necessity. Emergency conditions are subjectively determined crises in 
governance and potentially dangerous for those in positions of authority (Schmitt 2005:6). 
“Threats to international peace” as stated in Resolution 955 is a primary example. Freedom of 
political authority is sought only in conditions in which all other regulatory means are 
ineffective, and necessity legitimizes the exception against its alternatives. However, what is at 
stake is the judgment concerning the exception’s necessity. Necessary for what and whom are 
important and complex empirical questions. Although a unitary sovereign power is the response 
Schmitt and Agamben have to these questions, this is a reductionist and simplistic perspective on 
the nature of power and interests. Deciding the state of exception may be up to one or a select 
few individuals within a hierarchy, but external actors influence how the decision is made, when, 
and what the nature of exception is by shaping what is ‘necessary.’ These are all fluid 
considerations that in turn produce new regulatory norms as the legal form molds itself around 
the exception’s existence, and decision is not temporally limited to the exception’s creation. 
 
The Decision 
As discussed previously, the rule of law ideally operates through calculative modes of 
decision. Law’s purpose is to eliminate political action in favor of rational and economic 
decision (Schmitt 2005:27). Ultimate personal force in the form of a sovereign ruler is replaced 
by the modern ideal of liberal constitutionalism founded on an impartial rule of law that 
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maintains order through the calculation of threats and programed responses enshrined in positive 
jurisprudence (Schmitt 2005:22). Law is meant to be predictable and rational, and as such, power 
and force are incommensurate to the philosophical foundations of the rule of law (Agamben 
2005:1). However, there is a separation between the norm (the law) and its application. The 
former does not guarantee the latter without a concrete decision (Schmitt 2005:13). Law merely 
designates how a decision should be made, not who is in the position to decide and when a 
decision should be met. Along these lines, the state of exception is a fundamentally subjective 
matter concerning decision and its corresponding elements – when it is necessary, when it can be 
legitimated, who will benefit, and what form will it take. The law is incapable of informing these 
questions, and the exception is the manipulative product of sovereign power. 
The expression of power is most evident in situations that require interpretation and 
definition. Carl Schmitt (2005) argues that “all law is situational law,” meaning that legal 
application is a direct reference the situation the law is designed to respond to (13). When this 
situation appears in reality is a question law cannot answer – it requires a judgment on the part of 
those who use the law as an instrument of governance (Agamben 2005:30). Law is not a mystic 
unseen power but rather an institution created and applied by people in a position of authority. 
Between the legal code and its enforcement there must be an actor who decides the law is 
applicable and will be applied as such. The sovereign, in Schmitt’s view, is in a position of 
deciding truth to decide law’s application. The sovereign is outside of law in this capacity, using 
his own subjective judgment to decide the situational conditions law requires (Agamben 
1998:15). The unity between the legal order and the reality it references requires someone in the 




The legal state of exception is profoundly driven by subjective interpretation. For one, the 
normal state of governance, which the exception is in opposition to, must be enumerated by 
those with the power to define it (Agamben 1998:20-21). The sovereign body that applies law 
must first decide that the conditions for its application have been met, and enforcing a state of 
exception first requires defining the norm that has hence been transcended. Sovereign authorities 
are thereby in a position of defining what is normal as well as enumerating what is true 
(Agamben 1998:26). Interpreting where the norm has been exceeded and in what way is a 
subjective interpretation that is required of those in a position of authority to apply the law. For 
example, the Security Council alone was responsible for explaining how international security is 
exactly threatened in Rwanda to justify the creation of the ICTR. Secondly, the law-preserving 
purpose of the exception puts those in a position of decision in an advantageous yet corruptible 
position. What is necessary is a determination based on one’s position and interests, and those 
that decide the exception have a vested interest in ensuring the existing legal order is preserved. 
The justification for the decision to enforce a state of exception is true only in that the sovereign 
authority has deemed it true and doing so is to the advantage of those that benefit from law’s 
suspension (Schmitt 2005:16). This is precisely what makes this paradigm problematic for many 
theorists, most notably Giorgio Agamben. Situational truth that justifies the exception need not 
based in reality because the burden of proof rests on the responsibility of those in the power to 
decide. The decision to suspend law is a product and perpetuation of unlimited personal force in 





Returning to Security Council Resolution 955, the establishment of the ICTR has become 
more problematic once the above principles are applied. For one, the explicit mention of 
exceptionally grave and serious violations of international law in Rwanda creates the legal 
opportunity to pursue all means that are deemed necessary. Furthermore, the importance placed 
on maintaining “international peace and security” through the ICTR implicitly make the tribunal 
a political instrument for the preservation of international order, which benefits some actors at 
the expense of others. Additionally, the ability of the Security Council to place judgment on the 
evidence and decide what actions are necessary is a clear example of sovereign power over the 
exception. The Council alone is in the position to decide the validity of the premises that justify 
the exceptional intervention of the ICTR, especially in regard to existential threats to 
international order which may or may not be present in reality. However, as will be demonstrated 
in the following chapter, these justifications are frequently manipulated for the UN and the 
ICTR’s self-preservation. 
The ICC makes a similar interpretation of exception in sanctioning its investigation in 
Northern Uganda. Although the form of ICC intervention is already pre-established and not 
subject to the wishes of the UN, the ICC is still a court of exception that only investigates 
“serious crimes of international concern.” Because its intervention is the exception to the rule, it 
is manipulated for the political benefit of the Court. How and why it decides to intervene in 
Northern Uganda, who it chooses to indict, and how it negotiates its involvement implicate 
statutory laws that explicitly incorporate calculations of exception, and as a result, legal and 
investigatory decisions are deeply influenced by the Court’s political context. 
However, the above explanation opens up the ICTR, the ICC, and international criminal 
law in general to a more in-depth inquiry. What actors and contexts contributed to the decision to 
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create the ICTR, or in the case of the ICC, the decision to investigate the conflict in Northern 
Uganda? Who influences determinations of necessity in the ICTR and the ICC? How do the 
exceptional interventions of the ICTR and the ICC affect the interpretation of international 
criminal law? Are each institution’s statutory laws affected by their exceptional existence? These 
questions complicate international criminal law as a whole as well as a rigid understanding of the 
state of exception. Abstraction and ontological implications of the theoretical concepts presented 
here help explain these two cases of international legal intervention, yet these two case studies 
also inform a more complex and empirically grounded theory of exception. What the following 
case studies should demonstrate is that not only is the exception is an integral aspect of the 
functioning of international criminal law, but also that the nature of each institution, their 
respective criminal context, and the international political environment complicate this 
theoretical understanding. 
 
III. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Background 
 Prior to the systematic extermination of close to one million people, Rwanda had never 
been the subject of international legal scrutiny. An impoverished, land-locked East African 
nation the size of the state of Maryland with almost no international market share had little 
consequence to the international order before wholesale human destruction pushed it into the 
limelight. Initially given to Germany at the Berlin Conference of 1884, Rwanda was later 
relinquished to Belgium after the expropriation of German colonial territories following its 
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defeat in World War I, indirectly laying the framework for violent social discord that ultimately 
catalyzed into genocidal hatred. 
Administered together with Burundi, the Belgian colonial administration employed a 
policy of indirect rule that relied upon a fictitious ethnic divide. The Rwandan territory was 
populated by three principle population groups: Hutu, Tutsi and the indigenous Twa. The nature 
of this divide is generally attributed to pre-colonial migrations of Bantu and Nilotic African 
populations North and East respectively, but there still remains many historical uncertainties 
concerning their origins (Prunier 1998:16-18). Nevertheless, pre-colonial Rwandan society 
understood these claims of ancestral origin through a fluid system of social hierarchy. Rwandans 
shared similar cultural practices, a history of intermarriage, and a common religious practice. 
The pre-colonial social structure of Rwanda loosely adhered to a feudal division of labor 
between a largely horticulturist majority of Hutu, a pastoralist minority of Tutsi, and a scarce 
population of forest dwelling Twa where a member of one group could join another at a given 
point in time (Gourevitch 1998:48). Belgian authorities appropriated this divide to their 
advantage by empowering the Tutsi minority as the governing aristocracy, thereby sanctifying an 
exaggerated hierarchical social structure into colonial law. In the 1930s, through enforced 
Catholic missionization, Belgian authorities issued identity cards that defined each Rwandan’s 
ethnic bloodline to further exclude the Hutu population from public life, henceforth destroying a 
history of social mobility and instituting a fabricated ethnic-based power structure (Gourevitch 
1998:56-57). Due to a combination of Flemish influence and a rising tide of revolutionary 
sentiment, the balance of power was reversed in favor of the majority Hutu population in the 
1950s. Hutus began to reap vengeance on their previous aristocratic rulers by enforcing ethnic 
quotas in all public administrations and suppressing the Tutsi population in much the same way 
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as the Belgian administration. The Hutu elite seized upon a widespread feeling of animosity and 
sparked a wave of ethnically motivated violence, leading to the first of many Tutsi exoduses out 
of Rwanda north and south. Once Belgium left the country to its own devices in 1962, the Hutu 
population controlled every corner of the administration, and entrenched repression and ethnic 
violence became the norm (Prunier 1998: 52-54). 
 Rwanda had little strategic importance during the Cold War, and international 
ambivalence to the colonially fabricated plight of the Rwanda population continued into the late 
twentieth century. Violence escalated to a tipping point in the 1970s leading to a Second 
Rwandan Republic after a military coup led by Colonel Juvenal Habyarimana. An incendiary 
propaganda campaign against Tutsi civilians and sympathizers authored by Habyariman led to an 
increasing movement of Tutsis north to join the burgeoning diaspora (Gourevitch 1998: 68-73). 
Rwanda was also facing domestic turmoil after the economy took a disastrous downturn due to 
the commodity crashes of the early 1980s, putting further economic pressure on the densely 
settled Rwandan countryside that relied heavily on coffee and tea production. Habyarimana 
effectively closed the borders from Tutsi repatriation, and rising ethnic suppression influenced 
the diaspora to regain control. Tutsi refugees in Uganda started to take up arms in expectation 
that the violence would increase, and with the tactical and financial support of the Ugandan 
military, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) was organized and invaded Northern Rwanda in 
1990 (Gourevitch 1998:82).  
Juvenal Habyarimana, with French diplomatic assistance, was quickly losing ideological 
and military ground to the RPF and was forced into an international cease fire agreement in 1993 
in Arusha, Tanzania. The resulting Arusha Accords were a half-hearted international diplomatic 
effort to create order through a power-sharing government, and the newly instated UN 
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peacekeeping force UNAMIR was sent into Rwanda strictly to ensure the Habyarimana regime 
upheld the peace agreement. However, a political party and propaganda movement against the 
Tutsi population named ‘Hutu Power’ grew more pronounced under the pretext of the RPF 
invasion, and surmounting evidence of a government organized extermination plan against Tutsi 
civilians came to UNAMIR’s attention soon after it began operations in Rwanda. A youth militia 
called the interhamwe was provided with machetes, machine guns, and tactical support from the 
Rwandan government, and UNAMIR warned the UN on several occasions in early 1994 of the 
possibility of large scale ethnic conflict through an anonymous source within the Habyarimana 
government (Barnett 2002:77-88). The UN, though, was unconvinced and unwilling to put itself 
at risk, and UNAMIR was ordered to stick to its restrictive mandate that kept peacekeepers from 
proactively intervening.  
In the weeks that followed, peacekeepers continued to watch government funded Hutu 
militia in and around the capital city Kigali organize and prepare for war. Government officials 
drew up lists of prominent Tutsi intellectuals, public officials, alleged RPF interlocutors, and 
democratic Hutu’s opposed to the radical Hutu Power ideologues for extermination. President 
Habyarimana had no intention of adhering to the Arusha Accords and publicly announced his 
support for the radical Hutu Power officials on numerous occasions all under the watch of 
UNAMIR. However, Rwanda’s economy was still in shambles and needed continued 
international assistance to stay afloat. He continually assured UN and UNAMIR of his 
commitment to uphold his end of the bargain in face saving moves to appeal to international 
donors, as a result angering his violent ideological base. Hutu Power officials and media outlets 
continued their ideological campaign with greater zeal, even publically threatening to sacrifice 
their leader if he subverted their agenda. On April 6th, 1994, Juvenal Habyarimana was returning 
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from Arusha with the president of Burundi when his plane was shot down by a surface to air 
missile over Kigali.5 Details of the assassination and whether the RPF or the Rwandan army was 
responsible remains shrouded in mystery. Nevertheless, its immediate effect was the decapitation 
of the Rwandan government and the consolidation of the governing authority of Hutu Power. 
Within hours roadblocks throughout Kigali were manned and constructed to restrict any 
movement out of the city and radio broadcasters were instructing Rwandan citizens to kill any 
and all Tutsi and moderate Hutus (Prunier 1998:229). 
 UNAMIR reacted quickly and sent a contingent of ten Belgian peacekeepers to protect 
the compound of Hutu oppositionist and Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana in a matter of 
hours. Equipped with an execution list and government directives, the interhamwe surrounded 
the outnumbered Belgians. They were captured and sent to a nearby military camp where they 
were tortured, killed, mutilated, and found the next day by UNAMIR commander Romeo 
Dallier. One week later Belgium withdrew its peacekeeping forces, leaving UNAMIR ill-
equipped, ill-funded, and under-supported (Gourevitch 1998:150). The United States and 
European governments quickly evacuated their nationals with full knowledge they were leaving 
Rwandan civilians to die shortly thereafter. With United States support, the UN passed a 
resolution to slash the UNAMIR force by ninety percent, and thus the international abandonment 
of the Rwandan population had begun (Barnett 2002:127). Influential international actors, 
especially the United States, were not willing to risk the political capital to intervene when there 
                                                 
5 The plane involved was a gift from the French government and flown by French pilots. Because three French 
nationals were killed in the crash, French judge Jean-Louis Bruguière was able to exercise jurisdiction over the case 
and issued nine arrest warrants against ranking members of the Rwandan government in November 2006. An 
indictment against President Paul Kagame, though, had to be sent to the UN because of protections on diplomatic 
immunity in French law. Most recently, a French investigative team from another judge visited the crash site in 2010 
and concluded that the missile was fired from a position held by the Rwandan army at the time, possibly exonerating 
the RPF. These have been the only investigations into the plane crash, and the ICTR does not have jurisdiction over 
the crime because a political assassination does not constitute a war crime. 
27 
 
was no domestic interest to do so, particularly after the public embarrassment in Mogadishu, 
Somalia a year earlier (Barnett 2002:39).6 Moreover, UN peacekeeping forces were already 
spread thin in the Balkans and Southeast Asia, and the Rwandan genocide was rarely a topic of 
international media attention until scores of bodies began to flow into Lake Victoria months 
later. April turned into July without any military initiative to regain control beyond of the RPF 
offensive in the north and north-east. Almost all Hutu Power officials and architects of the 
genocide fled across international borders, some sheltered by European governments and even 
the Vatican. Ordinary citizens who carried out the killings fled west to Zaire, now the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and were sheltered in UN protected refugee camps. 
France organized an alleged humanitarian mission of its own called Operation Turquoise in late 
June that set up a buffer against the RPF in western Rwanda to supposedly allow refuges safe 
travel to Zaire, but it instead ended up protecting the genocidaires and impeded the RPF from 
regaining control (Gourevitch 1998:154-158). The RPF claimed victory after securing Kigali on 
July 17th, leaving behind a pattern of violence and destruction of their own (Des Forges 
1999:702-735). 
 The exact number of dead is disputed – the UN official number is 800,000 while the 
Rwandan government claims 1.2 million lost their lives. Regardless, the brutality of the genocide 
is uncharacteristic to violence of this magnitude. The majority of the killing was carried out by 
simple farm tools – machetes, hoes, axes, and clubs. Grenades and firearms were generally used 
for crowed control and killed relatively few. Small children were smashed against walls, women 
                                                 
6 On October 3, 1993, the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia UNOSOM, spearheaded by the US military, 
engaged in an aggressive battle in the Somalian capital city Mogadishu. Two US Blackhawk helicopters were shot 
down, and the ensuing ground battle resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers. Later that day, the bodies of 
American soldiers were filmed being dragged through the streets, resulting in a full withdrawal of US peacekeeping 
forces days later. UNAMIR was established only two days after the incident, October 5, 1993. 
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were often gang-raped before they were murdered, the wounded were thrown in mass graves to 
suffocate, and churches and places of sanctuary were bulldozed with people inside, all while an 
incapacitated peacekeeping force watched due to a lack of political will. The newly installed 
Tutsi RPF government was quick to maintain their position as the victim as well as savior in 
contrast to the international community that sat idly by and watched a country murder ten 
percent of its own population. Embarrassed and overburdened with guilt after failing to act, the 
United Nations confirmed evidence of genocide in September 1994 and recommended the 
establishment of an international tribunal to punish those responsible in a court of law. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established November 8th, 
1994 to adjudicate “serious violations of international humanitarian law” from January 1st to 
December 31st, 1994 in Rwanda and neighboring states (UNSC 955). Although a tribunal was 
first requested by the Rwandan government, the context within UN was a more direct catalyst to 
its creation than the RPF’s initial solicitation. The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former-Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established a year earlier to adjudicate the international conflict 
in the Balkans, which peacekeeping forces and NATO had been invested in pacifying for a 
number of years. If the United Nations did not act similarly in Rwanda, the international 
governing body would be tainted by charges of racism and having a double standard for the 
African continent (Akhavan 1996:501). Ad-hoc tribunals were also a pragmatic political strategy 
in responding to situations of humanitarian crisis. The ICTR and ICTY were a “neutral, 
universal, and above all apolitical” means for the international community to take action and 
demonstrate its moral fortitude without spending large amounts of human and political capital in 
aggressive peacekeeping missions (Oomen 2005:893). Tribunals were an inexpensive way for 
international political powers to save their moral reputation with little to no domestic political 
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cost (Rudolph 2001:662), and the precedent of the ICTY created an easy answer to rectify the 
impotence of international actors and the United Nations in Rwanda (Akhavan 1996:502). 
Rwandan government suspicions and its ultimate disagreement over the ICTR’s creation 
were the first political challenges the adjudication of genocide had to contend with. Rwanda’s 
judicial infrastructure was decimated after the genocide. Most accomplished jurists and judges 
either fled or were killed, not to mention the destruction of brick and mortar judicial 
establishments and essential implements needed to run a courtroom. Moreover, by November 
1994, Rwanda had inundated its prisons with over 120,000 people accused of genocide, none of 
which were those in charge of organizing, overseeing, and implementing the government 
directed slaughter (Oomen 2005:896). Most went into exile in Cameroon, Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
and Tanzania while others found refuge in Belgium, France, and other European nations (Peskin 
2008:157). Recognizing the logistical limitations, Rwanda initially requested a tribunal to help 
with the case load and arrest convicts being sheltered across international borders (Akhavan 
1996:504-505). 
However, their conception of a tribunal was much different from the ICTR, and Security 
Council Resolution 955 passed without Rwanda’s consent. By chance, Rwanda had a temporary 
seat on the Security Council and was the sole dissenting vote for numerous reasons, principle of 
which were the absence of the death penalty, the limited temporal jurisdiction, and the tribunal’s 
location in Arusha, Tanzania (Akhavan 1996:505-508). The death penalty was still part of 
Rwandan national law in 1994, and the Rwandan ambassador to the UN expressed concern that 
high-level genocide suspects would receive lenient sentences all the while lower-level suspects 
would be sentenced to death by Rwandan national courts. Furthermore, the lax international 
standards for penal conditions were viewed as criminal in themselves considering the brutality 
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characteristic of the genocide, and Rwandan prisoners would be clamoring to be sent to Arusha 
for better prison conditions and a chance of acquittal. This disparity, however, could not be 
negotiated in terms of international law. The norms governing the tribunal are international in 
scope, and by invoking the lofty expectations of “humanity” the Security Council put human 
rights including international sentencing norms in judgment, not Rwanda national sentiment. 
Nevertheless, the Rwandan delegation argued that Resolution 955 prioritized Rwandan 
reconciliation and rehabilitation in the Preamble of the ICTR Statute, putting international law at 
the bidding of the Rwandan people through an ambiguous partnership between reconciliation and 
international justice.  
The issue of the tribunal’s location played into this criticism as well. The Rwandan 
delegation argued that having the tribunal four hundred miles away would not contribute to 
national reconciliation. Arusha, though, had a history of international arbitration in the Rwandan 
conflict and would serve the appearances of fairness to the international judicial process, let 
alone the potential security risk of having the proceedings in Kigali. The possibility of the RPF 
directly influencing proceedings posed a risk to international powers that vested their reputations 
in international criminal law, and no matter how much the tribunal’s position in Kigali would 
have contributed to the reconciliation effort, the court was primarily an international enterprise 
designed to appease international guilt and put the values of human rights on display (Graubart 
2010:419-421). The negotiations over the ICTR made clear that international moral aversion 
would decide how the negotiation between Rwandan reconciliation and international justice 
developed, and human rights ultimately put Rwandan national law and healing as a lesser 
normative priority (Peskin 2008:161). The Rwandan genocide was the exception to ‘humanity,’ 
not just Rwanda, and the ICTR ensured humanity would sit in judgment in every way possible. 
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The ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction was contested by the RPF on the grounds that it did not 
implicate those responsible for engineering the genocide. The Rwandan delegation argued that 
the temporal jurisdiction was too limited to January 1994 because it would not address the 
government conspiracy leading up to the assassination of Habyarimana. However, the Security 
Council made clear that the United Nations would only judge the internationally recognized 
genocide as the exception, not its context. The temporal limitation of December 31st, 1994, 
though, was a contribution of the RPF. The scores of Rwandans who carried out the genocide 
fled en mass across the border to Zaire, and the RPF was already threatening a retaliatory 
invasion by the time of the negotiations if the UN did not act to neutralize the threat (Graubart 
2010:417). The Security Council could have left the ICTR mandate open-ended to the 
foreseeable future as it did with the ICTY. Genocide related violence along the Zaire-Rwanda 
border were not uncommon in the immediate aftermath of the RPF takeover, and giving the 
ICTR jurisdiction over the RPF’s future military actions was a threatening but realistic prospect 
given the precedent of the ICTY. Nevertheless, the Rwandan government ensured they would 
not be culpable for their possible international campaign westward by lobbying for and 
ultimately winning the arbitrary temporal restriction in December (Peskin 2008:162). As a result, 
the ICTR was incapable of ensuring accountability for the hundreds of thousands of Congolese 
civilians killed in the Rwandan invasion of its neighbor in 1996. 
In the end, the Rwandan delegation voted against the ICTR mandate for the above 
reasons and many others, some of which were foreboding and valid concerns. Even though the 
ICTR continued without the official blessing of Rwanda, the RPF had pledged its cooperation to 
the tribunal and allowed it access to government archives (Morris 1997:357). After all, the 
tribunal was putting on trial the vanquished forces and the RPF had all the more to benefit 
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(Graubart 2010:418). However, the Rwandan government had full knowledge of its vital role in 
the tribunal’s day-to-day operations. UN officials publically admitted that without Rwandan 
cooperation, access to witness testimony, documentary evidence, and potential suspects would be 
impossible (Cruvellier 2010:13). The political environment played to the advantage of the RPF, 
and as will be discussed in more depth later, the Rwandan government would exercise its 
political superiority whenever it felt threatened and enabled it to manipulate the application of 
law. In the meantime, Tribunal officials moved quickly to secure a reliable diplomatic channel 
with the Rwandan government, and investigations were underway by early 1995 (Akahavan 
1996:509). 
 
Exceptional Crimes and International Politics 
 Internationally mandated justice was not a novel idea by the time of the Rwandan 
genocide. In fact, the legacy left behind by the World War II Nuremburg and Tokyo military 
tribunals contributed the most to the Security Council’s insistence on legal diplomacy in the 
early 1990s. Victorious Allied forces saw international law as a means to demonstrate its moral 
fortitude and further maintain the legitimacy of the war by committing to “stay the hand of 
vengeance” and put the Nazi and Japanese regimes on trial for the whole world to watch 
(Jackson 1972:20).7 It was a means of giving meaning to the whole military enterprise millions 
of people died for, but primarily it was part of a strategy of political self-promotion (Graubart 
2010:414). Allied powers pursued postwar security interests under the guise of international law 
                                                 
7 This phrase is part of US Nuremburg Prosecutor Robert Jackson’s opening statement for the tribunal. The full 
quote in context further illustrates the above point: “That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with 
injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of 
the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason” (Jackson 1972). 
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through the tribunals, utilizing them to achieve moral victory. International consensus today 
conceives the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials as a paradigmatic example of “victor’s justice” – 
using law retroactively from a position of power to punish the vanquished (Graubart 2010:412). 
Carl Schmitt theorized twenty years before World War II that claiming to act in the interests of 
‘humanity’ is the “usurping of a universal concept against one’s opponent,” and using the 
category of “war crimes” from a position of power to judge the Nazi regime as normatively 
illegitimate is the utilization of a universal moral principle to achieve moral supremacy (Schmitt 
2007:54). The norms that govern international criminal law have instrumental value in 
international security and they were selectively applied only against the Nazi regime and 
Japanese military to allow for this manipulation (Rudolph 2001:658). The post-WWII military 
tribunals were a troubling precedent for international criminal law that would resurface in the 
ICTR – the application of customary international norms through law in an exceptional manner 
only when it is politically advantageous. 
 The ICTR’s relationship to Nuremburg is not direct but nevertheless implicit. There was 
no military victory on the part of the international community in Rwanda – quite the opposite. In 
fact, if the UN heeded the warnings of UNAMIR and intervened proactively, the tribunal never 
would have been created (Akhavan 1996:501). Instead, the international community neglected its 
normative obligations to protect against genocide and had to rescue them through an 
international tribunal. The RPF victors frequently appealed to their victimhood, shaming the 
international community to apply justice on their behalf (Peskin 2008:152). Moral guilt 
characterized the tribunal’s purpose in repairing the UN’s legitimacy by exploiting the moral 
consciousness of ‘humanity’ retroactively and selectively. Law was a way of putting on display 
the international norms that should have been enforced four months prior. The ICTR was an 
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international political exercise from the beginning, and although the Preamble of the ICTR 
mandate did explicitly put international proceedings as an extension of national reconciliation, 
the tribunal was instead an inexpensive and expedient means of resurrecting the UN’s moral 
authority (Rudolph 2001:683). 
The UN was not the victor but rather the loser in this equation (Cruvellier 2010:166). The 
RPF undoubtedly ended the genocide against its own Tutsi citizenry all while the UN was 
paralyzed by political fear. This position of weakness on the part of the international community 
required necessary action with few alternatives. Many critics of the ICTR argue that the money 
and effort spent on constructing the tribunal would have been better spent supporting the 
Rwandan judiciary. However, the precedent of the ICTY would have only caused further damage 
to the UN’s moral legitimacy if it choose to adopt a different strategy for Rwanda (Des Forges 
and Longman 2004:49). The conflict in the Former-Yugoslavia had a lower death toll than the 
Rwandan genocide yet a significantly greater political investment in the form of peacekeeping 
forces and international legal experts. Both invoked the same moral valuation and the sacred call 
of ‘humanity,’ and a different standard in Rwanda, regardless of its supposed efficiency, would 
never have been adopted by the Security Council of which Rwanda was a member. More 
practically, though, a judicial development project would have required an exponentially greater 
amount of funding and logistical resources along with being more politicized given the 
politically influenced Rwandan judiciary (Des Forges and Longman 2004:62). In other words, 
the tribunal was an efficient, relatively inexpensive intervention that had little to no political 
baggage in the domestic contexts of donor governments. It was an easy political decision to use 
the tribunal as a way of saving the UN from moral irrelevancy in the name of ‘humanity’ 
(Cruvellier 2010:167). In this regard, Nuremburg and the ICTR are quite similar. Exceptional 
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international criminal intervention was used to bolster moral legitimacy in both cases (Peskin 
2008:7). However, unlike Nuremburg, the ICTR was the product of political necessity to save 
the UN from a public relations disaster, and ultimately this position made the tribunal easier to 
accept. 
The state of exception is evident throughout the ICTR’s political foundation. Most 
obviously, ‘humanity’ is invoked as a means of justifying unconventional legal intervention 
(Wilson 2010:30). The ICTR is the first international criminal tribunal to adjudicate violations of 
international law in a non-international armed conflict (Moghalu 2002:276). International order 
was under threat in terms of the decreasing relevancy of universal human rights, not existential 
threats to security or material interests (Des Forges, Longman 2004:52). It was not that the UN 
abandoned a conflict, which it has done many times before, but that the Rwandan genocide left 
almost a million dead, caused the largest international human movement in history, and 
decimated an entire nation. It was certainly an extra-ordinary case of political violence, and 
protecting the status quo of state sovereignty would ultimately drive a stake through the already 
impotent human rights moral compass. The ICTR was aimed at preserving and strengthening the 
efficacy of human rights discourse first and foremost. The human rights ethic as a whole was 
threatened, and the Rwandan genocide was appropriated as the exception in order to suspend the 
norm of state sovereignty for its preservation. The tribunal’s primary jurisdiction over the 
genocide ensured that international criminal law maintained control over all domestic and 
international legal actions, which was justified by the “compelling humanitarian interests 
involved” that only an international tribunal could represent (El Zeidy 2008:403). This law-
preserving purpose of ICTR went hand-in-hand with its law-making functions as well. The ICTY 
had already begun its proceedings by the time the ICTR had started to function, and the two 
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tribunals together were a combined aspect of the ongoing negotiations surrounding a possible 
permanent international judiciary (Morris 1997:356). The idea of a standing international court 
was slowly coming to fruition in negotiations and civil society advocacy in the 1990s, but 
international criminal law had absolutely no precedent for genocide or crimes against humanity, 
let alone a genuine expression of impartial, apolitical proceedings. The Rwandan genocide 
created an opportunity to fill these gaps: one, the Rwanda government had given the UN its 
initial blessing and two, creating a tribunal was politically pragmatic. Furthermore, the ICTR was 
set up with an emerging case law in mind by virtue of its partnership with the ICTY (Des Forges, 
Longman 2004:49). The two tribunals initially shared both a chief prosecutor to ensure a 
consistent prosecutorial strategy and an appeals chamber to ensure consistent legal 
interpretations (Morris 1997:355). Both institutions were a part of the same valuation of law in 
situations of moral crisis, and the fate of one inherently affected the fate of the other. Out of the 
ashes of moral failure would come an international legal regime with results, case law, and 
political support that would make a possible permanent court effective and legitimate (Jallow 
279). What emerged instead was a politically influenced legal practice precipitated by the 
political necessities that demanded its intervention in the first place. 
 
Jurisprudence and Evidentiary Practice 
 The saving grace for the donors and stakeholders of international legal intervention is its 
apparent apolitical form. The legal statutes that govern the ICTR were adopted by international 
consensus and their adjudication was designed with protections against political interference and 
interpretation. Prosecutorial discretion was tightly regulated through checks and balances within 
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the different organs of the tribunal, not to mention the standard of proof – beyond a reasonable 
doubt – was strict enough to limit politically motivated cases with weak evidentiary support. The 
ICTR, though, had a number of daunting jurisprudential challenges in Rwanda given the absence 
of case law that required a degree flexibility in its legal decisions. For one, the ICTR was 
mandated to adjudicate genocide, which had never been adjudicated before in a court of law. In 
applying the Geneva Conventions of 1948, the onus of proof in genocide cases rests on 
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to destroy in whole or in part 
a national, religious, racial, or ethnic group (Statute Article 2). Facing an enormous caseload 
involving the same types of charges, the ICTR had to confront the question of the legal status of 
Rwandan Tutsis in relation to this standard to determine if a genocide had occurred at all. Given 
the growing amount of evidence and testimony that indicated that Tutsis where characteristically 
not a national, religious, racial, or ethnic group, the ICTR Trial and Appeal Chambers were 
forced to broaden the interpretation of the law or risk reducing the events of 1994, and by 
extension the tribunal, to irrelevancy. Moreover, the tribunal’s legal acknowledgment of the 
genocide involved a complex negotiation between legal and non-legal fact. When the Appeals 
Chamber took judicial notice of the genocide as a fact of common knowledge, the tribunal 
exercised its mandate and strategically lessened its judicial burden all at once. Demands for 
expediency and the ICTR’s own legal mandate pressured the appellate chamber into recognizing 
the genocide as an historical rather than adjudicated truth, in the process taking a controversial 
form that potentially undermined the rights of the accused. 
 Furthermore, the condition of post-genocide Rwanda forced an inventive and flexible 
prosecutorial strategy. Unlike the interstate conflict in the Balkans, the Rwandan genocide left 
little to no documentary evidence. The Prosecution had to rely solely on witness testimony in all 
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genocide cases, much of which was contradictory or unreliable. In many instances, trials became 
a public forum for witnesses to voice communal and interfamilial feuds with informants playing 
against each other to the detriment of the prosecution (Cruvellier 2010:77). Moreover, high level 
defendants were a potential source of evidence that the prosecution on many occasions 
improperly relied upon. Influential victims’ organizations, with veiled government support, often 
felt betrayed by the tribunal’s procedural leniency towards the genocidaires and withdrew their 
cooperation on multiple occasions, sometimes inciting nation-wide boycotts. 
 The above challenges of witness testimony, applying genocide law in Rwanda, and taking 
judicial notice all required negotiation and flexibility in the prosecutorial and judicial elements of 
the tribunal. Both organs of the ICTR, though, were cognizant of the concerns for the 
preservation of the tribunal as well as the international and domestic political contexts the 
tribunal was embedded in. As each challenge of the ICTR’s judicial process below will 
demonstrate, flexible judicial procedures and responses to the political limitations of the tribunal 
closely followed the logic of exception. Subjective determinations of necessity propelled both 
judges and prosecutors to use and manipulate the exceptional intervention of international 
criminal law to politically expedient ends. The questionable value of witness testimony, a 
contextually influenced interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, and a questionable means of 
taking judicial notice provide support for the argument that international criminal law in Arusha 
was embedded in the practice of exception and as a consequence allowed for politically 
manipulated legal interpretations. 
 
a. Witness Testimony 
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The Rwandan genocide was not a product of bureaucratic artifice but rather a systematic 
incitement of Rwandan civilians to kill their own neighbors. What this means for the prosecution 
is that a documented trail of evidence proving the guilt of the accused would be limited if not 
non-existent. Government files and communications were either destroyed during the impending 
RPF invasion or proved little in the whole scope of criminal accountability. Moreover, the crimes 
of particular importance to the prosecution intersected across indictments meaning not only that 
each case relied on evidence from other cases, but also that defendants could potentially 
implicate each other over the course of the tribunal’s proceedings. This context created a reliance 
on a limited amount of key witness testimony, particularly that of defendants (Des Forges, 
Longman 2004:53). One witness could potentially testify in multiple trials at a time, but each 
testimony had to be consistent or else this carefully constructed web would crumble on top of the 
prosecution and by extension the tribunal as a whole.  
The crimes under investigation often relied on key witnesses to identify the defendant in 
a specific time, place, and course of action to support the prosecution’s case theory in a critical 
juncture. The Rwandan genocide, as discussed previously, involved an overwhelming amount of 
actors, perpetrators, associates, victims, and bystanders, all which had differing vantage points 
and memories about the event in question that had to be vetted by trial judges. Moreover, the 
social context within post-genocide Rwanda led many witnesses to lie and conceal details to 
avoid being implicated themselves back in Rwanda. This was an accepted fact among Rwandans, 
especially involving notorious cases with an accompanying risk for testifying for the prosecution 
(Cruvellier 2010:96). What this circumstance amounted to in court was the need for consistent, 
reliable, and poignant witness testimony from numerous witnesses, which is a near impossible 
task given the large number of differing narratives. If the prosecution could not get a confession, 
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which was the main objective in many instances, witness credibility tests, cross-examinations, 
and large volumes of testimony would flood years of trials with the pivotal question of guilt 
riding on a small amount testimony deemed credible by trial judges. 
In the case of Alfred Musema, this dynamic led to a doubtful trial verdict that in turn 
damaged the tribunal’s appearances of impartiality and led many observers to view the ICTR’s 
valuation of evidence as an arbitrary exercise. Alfred Musema was the first defendant to be 
convicted of rape as a crime of genocide in a court of law as well as the first to publicly 
recognize the Tutsi as victims, which differed from the general of trend of total denial that 
characterized the majority of defense testimony (Cruvellier 2010:85). Musema’s verdict, though, 
brings to light a troubling practice of evidence admissibility in the courtroom. The prosecution 
relied on a small number of witnesses to prove Musema’s rape charge, no two of which were 
declared credible by the same judge (Cruvellier 2010:95). In the end, the already doubtful rape 
charge was confirmed unanimously by all three judges all because of one fortunately timed piece 
of witness testimony that was what one observer characterized as “uncoordinated, miraculously 
belated, and unbelievable in its narrative continuity” (Cruvellier 2010:99). The defense case, on 
the other hand, had documentary evidence to support Musema’s alibi denying his command 
responsibility, none of which was accepted as authentic and no supporting evidence was given 
by the judges to justify this conclusion (Cruvellier 2010:95). Not even a year later three different 
sources of contradictory testimony surfaced, leading to the overturning of the court’s first rape 
conviction on November 16th, 2001 (Cruvellier 2010:101). Musema’s life sentence was upheld 
due to his standing genocide conviction, but the public and the defense counsel’s trust in a 
diligent and fair proceeding in Arusha was irreparably damaged. But more so, this case was 
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indicative of a general trend of the demand for questionable determinations of validity in 
particular testimony by the trial judges in order for a verdict to be made at all. 
Witness protection was a matter of vital importance to the tribunal if it was to persuade 
witnesses to make the four hundred mile journey from Kigali to testify. Although the tribunal 
relied heavily on closed court sessions and classified written testimony, arguably to the detriment 
of fair and open proceedings (Cruvellier 2010:51-53), cooperating with the tribunal was an open 
secret to almost all witness associates inside Rwanda (Cruvellier 2010:121). Many risked the 
possibility of harassment and violence as consequence of their involvement. In 1996, the UN 
Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda documented 227 deaths and 56 injuries related to 
ICTR cooperation as well as numerous accounts of threats and intimidation (Rudolph 2001:669). 
Rwanda’s insistence on repatriation of Hutu refugees and strongly encouraged national 
reconciliation efforts created a hostile environment where perpetrators and victims lived side by 
side out of necessity, and the ICTR’s witness protection program could do little to mend the 
feelings of mistrust. Due to the adversarial nature of the proceedings, the trials arguably 
enflamed ethnic tensions within Rwanda. Intervening in a contentious political environment risks 
this possibility from the onset, and Rwanda has often been used as a case study to illuminate this 
concern (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2004:24-25). 
Victims had an enormous amount of political leverage in the proceedings as well. The 
issue of state and local cooperation will be discussed in more depth later, but a preliminary point 
regarding victims’ organizations is relevant to the contested issue of securing reliable testimony. 
Ibuka and Avega, the two largest genocide victims’ organization in Rwanda, provided political 
representation to the countless families receiving government and international assistance. They 
were also controlled and monitored by the Rwandan government (Peskin 2008:194). Each 
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organizations’ board of directors was headed by an RPF installed representative in the early 
2000s, making their political messages a veiled government agenda under the pretext of civil 
society (Haskell and Waldorf 2011:57). Ibuka and Avega were initially supportive of the idea of 
international prosecutions, as were almost all victimized Rwandans in the initial stages of the 
tribunal. But in the event that the ICTR made an unpopular decision, which it did frequently, 
each organization could rally their constituents in non-cooperation with the tribunal, drastically 
limiting the pool of potential witnesses and sometimes as a result damaging ongoing cases 
(Moghalu 2002a:30). On one occasion, trial judges laughed in open court at what appeared to be 
a rape victim testifying for the prosecution (Peskin 2008:199-200). Although the judges were 
laughing at the incompetence of the defense counsel, Rwandan media outlets and victims’ 
organizations appropriated the story as evidence of judicial arrogance. Ibuka and Avega, with 
concealed government support (Peskin 2008:201), mobilized their position of victimhood against 
the international community as a whole to organize a boycott of ICTR proceedings (Des Forges, 
Longman 2004:54). Although this particular issue was later resolved, relations with the victims’ 
organizations remained contested. ICTR investigation teams found it increasingly difficult to 
work through these organizations as distrust and government manipulation continued, thereby 
limiting the availability of large numbers of potential witnesses in investigation and trial stages. 
Although the standard of proof within the ICTR statute is strict, it still demands contextual 
interpretation. Witness testimony in socially divisive environments is bound to be politically 
influenced, and the prevalence of contradictions, political intimidation, and distrust necessitated 
that the tribunal take the questionable nature of witness testimony into account from the onset. 
Verdicts had to be made on a limited amount of seemingly valid evidence, otherwise the tribunal 
would self-destruct under its own interpretation of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Law in Arusha 
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demanded that the tribunal lower its evidentiary expectations. If the tribunal was going to secure 
any conviction at all, accepting questionable witness testimony was necessary. 
 
b. Genocide Jurisprudence 
Rwandan Tutsis are undoubtedly a discernable social group, but under international treaty 
law, how to characterize them was unclear. International working definitions of ethnicity as 
having a distinct culture, heritage, or language does not apply to the social context of Rwandan 
Hutus and Tutsis (Wilson 2010:37). Racial groups are defined as those which have distinctive 
physical features stemming from particular historical origins (Wilson 2010:37). Although 
miniscule physical differences of Hutus and Tutsis were appropriated in the colonial era as a 
basis for racial separation, generations of intermarriage and exogamous relationships eliminated 
any external differences. They are not political groups either because membership in either one is 
determined by ancestry. When viewed from a positivist reading of international criminal law, the 
murder of almost one million Rwandans was not a genocide (Moghalu 2002:280-281). This 
conclusion, though, was a forgone impossibility when the ICTR was established. Its mandate 
was to adjudicate the prima facie evidence of genocide gathered by the UN Commission of 
Inquiry, and it was evident from the outset that a strict legal interpretation was contrary to this 
objective (Wilson 2010:34). However, given the political impracticality and danger a strict 
positivist reading of the Geneva Conventions would be, it was necessary that the ICTR make a 
legally sound and politically viable reading of its genocide law that broadened the scope of its 
letter to fit the Rwandan context. 
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In its landmark Akayesu judgment on October 2nd, 1998, the ICTR upheld the first ever 
genocide conviction in an international court by, in essence, rewriting the law. The trial 
chambers granted in a unanimous verdict that the Tutsi population was not protected under 
existing international genocide law (Wilson 2010:38). However, this fact was politically and 
practically untenable. Regardless of the working legal definition, the international community 
writ large viewed what happened in Rwanda as genocide, and relegating the authoritative 
decision of this historical fact to a strict positivist reading would have doomed international 
legalism to irrelevancy in political discourse. The trial chambers instead revisited the intentions 
of the drafters of the Genocide Convention of 1948 and concluded that the law in its current form 
did not express the original intentions of the fifty year old treaty. Rather, the trial judges argued 
that the Convention was aimed at protecting any “stable or permanent group” where membership 
is “determined by birth” (Prosecutor v. Akayesu para. 511, 516, 701-702). The Tutsis fit this bill, 
and this flexible approach in applying the law ensured the ICTR would judge the events of 1994 
in the way it was expected. 
The issue as to how stable group membership would be determined within the tribunal 
remained unsettled, though. The Akayesu verdict established an objective understanding of social 
membership that judged social dynamics through demonstrable fact. Membership by birth had to 
be an empirically evaluated, declaring the subjective perspective of perpetrators irrelevant and 
impossible to evaluate in a court of law (Wilson 2010:39). The ICTR trial judges, though, 
changed their mind in the Kayishmema verdict in May 1999 by understanding group association 
through the subjective perspective of the accused (Wilson 2010:44). The prosecution now had to 
show, almost paradoxically, the defendant’s intent to destroy a subjectively defined group of 
people through “reasonable, objective” facts (Wilson 2010:44). Moreover, Kayishema defined 
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Tutsis as an ethnic group, reversing Akayesu and establishing jurisprudence that required the 
prosecutor to prove “objective” social facts from subjective states of mind. The two positions 
were then reconciled in the Rutaganda verdict in December 1999 after a fourth change of 
jurisprudence (Wilson 2010:46). The verdict established a case specific contextual strategy to 
both the mindset of the accused and the objective social position of Rwandan Tutsis (Jallow 
2008:270). The complicated relationship in genocide law between intent and social fact gave 
way to an inefficient yet politically conservative means of adjudicating genocide after 
Rutaganda. The prosecution now had to prove in each case that Rwandan Tutsis were a “stable, 
permanent group” given the specific contextual circumstances of the accused and the crime in 
question (Wilson 2010:46, Jallow 2008:271). This “contextual approach” enabled the tribunal to 
take the bare minimum amount of action in judging the contested social and historical 
contingencies of Rwanda without supporting a potentially controversial stance on ethnicity and 
race. Faced with an inadequate law that did not fit the social context, the tribunal opted to 
interpret its fickle jurisprudence according to the case, thereby never making an authoritative 
adjudication of the social foundation of the genocide the tribunal was mandated to judge. 
Legally established knowledge and non-legal consensus diverged in the ICTR’s initial 
judgments on the social foundation of the genocide, and the balances tipped in favor of non-legal 
consensus (Wilson 2010:51). Concluding that there was no legally understood genocide in 1994 
went directly against numerous UN Commissions, Rwandan victims, media reports, expert 
testimony, and customary understanding. Through trial and error, the ICTR trial chambers 
ensured that its mandate was upheld, and law was negotiated around the necessity to fulfill this 
mandate. The effects of a flexible “contextual approach” to international criminal law remain 
unclear, but potentially it means the jurisprudence of the ICTR is incommensurate with other 
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contexts. Rwandan social complexities improved the application of law in many respects, 
arguably amending an impossibly constrained statutory definition of genocide. However, this 
genocide jurisprudence also set a precedent of international law being informed by political and 
social contingency. The ICTR negotiated a politically construed inadequacy in positive law, and 
although the social conditions required this legal interpretation if the tribunal was to fulfill its 
mandate, the tribunal’s revaluation of how to legally establish genocide in Rwanda proved that 
because international criminal law is exceptional and governed by its necessity in preserving a 
juridical order, it is manipulated by its domestic and international context. 
 
c. Judicial Notice 
On June 16th, 2006, the ICTR exercised its position of authority and recognized the Rwandan 
genocide as an irrefutable historical fact through judicial notice (Prosecutor v Edouard Karemera 
para 34). Judicial notice is a way to maintain consistency in jurisprudence and increase the 
efficiency of ongoing proceedings by establishing the truth of an undeniable historical or 
adjudicated fact (Jørgensen 2007:886). The use of judicial notice in international criminal law 
prior to the ICTR was unprecedented, especially in light of the high standard of proof 
international courts demand. However, given the specific subject matter jurisdiction of ad-hoc 
international tribunals like the ICTR, judicial notice was utilized as a valuable means of 
officially establishing the truth in a fundamental or recurring disagreement. Establishing an 
official record of the Rwandan genocide was also vital to the efficiency and legacy of the ICTR’s 
legal proceedings as an extension of UN diplomacy. Before 2006, the prosecution had to prove 
individual criminal responsibility and genocidal intent alongside the legal status of Rwandan 
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Tutsis in every case, and as efficiency became a more contested political issue among the 
tribunal’s international patrons, judicial notice was an effective mechanism to consider. 
However, once the ICTR took judicial notice of the Rwandan genocide, the rights of the accused 
in ongoing genocide cases were potentially undermined. Legal recognition of genocide includes 
the legal recognition of intent, which is case specific, not a general matter of fact. Following the 
judicial notice, though, intent could be inferred by the defendant’s association in the historically 
recognized pattern of genocide. Moreover, the ICTR Appeals Chamber chose to take judicial 
notice not through legal adjudication but rather acknowledgement of “facts of common 
knowledge,” which requires no judicially established truth. 
A conviction on genocide charges establishes two things – recognition of a victimized group 
and the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, said group. Recognizing a widespread occurrence 
of genocide thereby infers a general trend of intent, as a result complicating the presumption of 
innocence (Jørgensen 2007:888). Although it was impractical for the prosecution to prove the 
same facts in each trial, the greater the prosecutor’s burden of proof, the greater the presumption 
of innocence – a universally recognized prerequisite for fair, impartial proceedings. However, 
after the ICTR took judicial notice in 2006, the accused’s fundamental rights were compromised. 
Intent could be inferred from the defendant’s complicity with a pre-acknowledged occurrence of 
a crime of genocide, even if intent could not be proven by objective and demonstrable facts in a 
specific case. Moreover, almost all defendants at the ICTR disputed the occurrence of an anti-
Tutsi genocide, making this defense ipso facto false after 2006 (Jørgensen 2007:888). Officially 
recognizing the occurrence of genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda, though, eased the 
prosecution’s investigative burden and ultimately benefitted of international criminal law’s 
political relevance. The trial stages of the ICTR’s proceedings were shortened and the tribunal 
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finally produced an explicit legal acknowledgment of the Rwandan genocide it was mandated to 
adjudicate. 
However, the method through which the judicial notice was made was influenced by the 
political and legal limitations of the tribunal. Under the ICTR Rules and Procedure, the tribunal 
can establish a judicial notice of an adjudicated fact or a common, undeniable historical event 
that is relevant to the proceedings (Jørgensen 2007:885). By 2006, the ICTR had finished 
groundbreaking genocide trials with important legal precedent relevant to the Rwandan context. 
Nevertheless, these adjudicated facts were taken as irrelevant in officially acknowledging the 
genocide. Under the ICTR Rules and Procedure, taking judicial notice through adjudicated fact is 
discretionary, but taking notice of undeniable historic fact is mandatory (Jørgensen 2007:892). 
The Appeals Chamber was reluctant to judge the macro occurrence of Rwandan genocide solely 
through law given its previous difficulty in applying the Geneva Conventions, so it used media 
reports, UN Commissions, expert testimony, and international recognition of its occurrence to 
define it as historical fact instead. Making such a determination, though, runs the risk of reducing 
the legal project of the tribunal to irrelevancy. The judicial notice removed law from the legal 
decision, undermining the legitimacy and relevancy of international criminal law in Rwanda 
(Jørgensen 2007:895). Understanding the genocide as a fact of common knowledge, however, 
was a prudential way of improving the efficiency of the proceedings when the lengthy and 
seemingly irrelevant trials became more contested in Rwanda and the UN (UNSC res 1165). The 
ICTR had a volume of case law it could have used to take the more onerous judicial notice of 
adjudicated fact, but instead the tribunal interpreted the Rwandan genocide in a way to ease the 
prosecution’s burden and bolster the ICTR authority as a surrogate of the international 
community at the same time (Jørgensen 2007:896). Genocide in the context of a court of law is a 
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legal determination, but the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR instead interpreted it as a fact of 
common knowledge by virtue of its purpose in strengthening the UN’s political order, 
complicating the presumption of innocence in the process (Jørgensen 2007:892).  
The question of which genocides are “notorious historical events” and which ones are 
legally established to be true is a matter of political context, and the ICTR judicial notice 
exemplified this point. Given that the events at Srebrenica in 1998 were defined as a legally 
adjudicated genocide by the ICTY and the Rwandan genocide was not, the role of international 
legal institutions in constructing an official record of mass atrocity is embedded in the political 
context and the foundations of necessity on which they are created (Jørgensen 2007:897). Taking 
judicial notice of the genocide was an important step for the ICTR’s formal recognition of the 
plight of Rwanda, but it was not the product of legal precedent – it was an exceptional 
negotiation of law made in response to international criminal law’s contextual limitations in 
Rwanda. In fact, the ICTR could have taken the same judicial notice in 1994 using the same 
argument it used in 2006 with the same effects. The ICTR instead opted for a way to minimize 
its burden without subjecting itself further to the difficult and publically irrelevant task of 
understanding the Rwandan genocide through statutory law, although it damaged the 
presumption of innocence in future cases as a result. 
 
State and International Cooperation 
 As a product of a normative order based in political impartiality, international legal 
institutions have no police force or for that matter any aggressive means of coercion. Although 
the ICTR and the ICTY are authoritative human rights enforcement institutions that were 
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implemented without local permission, the tribunals must rely on state cooperation to arrest 
suspects, carry out indictments, provide evidence, and facilitate investigations (Statute Article 28 
para 2). A state refusal to cooperate with a tribunal could be disastrous for ongoing proceedings 
as well as the tribunal’s political standing (Peskin 2008:3). Tribunals are not independent from 
the political context they aim to adjudicate – much to the contrary. The statutory mandate of the 
ICTR is contested in a divisive debate of universal jurisdiction’s infringement on state 
sovereignty, and for both the tribunal and state to achieve each other’s respective goals, 
persuasion, coercion, and most of all negotiation between law and political compromise must be 
exercised. In the case of state cooperation, law is often utilized as a bargaining chip by a legal 
institution that can spare some from prosecution at the expense of others for a more desired end. 
Local actors, however, are threatened by law but also enable its application, and in the ICTR, the 
Rwandan government held a politically superior position of control in both aspects. Although the 
tribunal had primary jurisdiction over genocide cases and could have acted as the sovereign 
decision maker in all aspects of the adjudication of genocide, law – i.e. indictments, extradition, 
evidence, and verdicts – it was in large part beholden to the wishes of the Rwandan government. 
International political will to ensure the RPF upheld its obligation to cooperate was limited 
considering the UN and other international powers invested in the ICTR had lost the moral high 
ground. The tribunal was a product of this moral defeat, and although international genocide 
trials benefited the new RPF regime by normatively discrediting its political enemies, battles 
over suspects, unpopular legal decisions, and investigations into RPF atrocities gave the 
Rwandan government ample political justification to exert its dominance. 
 Influencing the tribunal came primarily in the form of refusals to provide the prosecution 
with the necessary resources it needed to function, most important of which was witness 
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testimony. At the ICTR’s own admission, without the Rwandan government’s blessing, there 
would be no evidence and hence no trials (Cruvellier 2010:161). Initially, the RPF had no 
interest in derailing the tribunal because it benefitted their international and domestic legitimacy, 
but as the RPF came to consolidate power in Rwanda, pressuring the tribunal became 
domestically and internationally possible. Although the ICTR could appeal to the Security 
Council in the event of Rwandan intransigence, the UN had no interest in starting a contentious 
diplomatic discourse when it had no political leverage. As a matter of fact, states like the US and 
the UK had strategic security objectives in Central Africa and would ultimately support the RPF 
in its conflicts with the ICTR. Unlike the ICTY, which acted as an extension of military 
intervention, the ICTR was practically isolated in resolving political disagreements. 
 The consequences of this dynamic in the end damaged the efficacy of legalist 
interventions in situations of humanitarian crisis. For one, valid legal decisions were frequently 
compromised by the political incompetence of the tribunal. As mentioned before, jurisprudence 
toed a delicate line of political sensitivity all the while needing to appear as impartial and 
independent. Polarizing legal decisions could potentially damage the entire enterprise of the 
ICTR if state cooperation was withdrawn, and on many occasions legal decisions were made 
according to their possible ramifications for the tribunal’s survival. International criminal law’s 
exceptional basis allowed for these politically prudential and motivated decisions. Those indicted 
were seemingly chosen due to the legal categorizations of criminal responsibility, but on 
numerous occasions ICTR indictments were made or avoided based on the possibility of 
conviction or political bargains of extradition made with the Rwandan government. Lower-level 
defendants were brought to trial due to the high likelihood of a conviction, which was especially 
important in appearing effective in its first years. Additionally, higher-level defendants were 
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passed up and given to the Rwandan judiciary in response to political protests from the RPF. The 
Chief Prosecutor had a large degree of discretion in deciding how these disagreements were 
negotiated, and when the ICTR began investigations on the RPF, the tribunal faced its largest 
political battle. Fearing possible indictments, the Rwandan government blackmailed the 
prosecutor into dropping the inquiry by restricting the travel of witnesses and creating a climate 
of political intimidation in Rwanda against the investigation team. The ICTR had no effective 
means of recourse and the UN negotiated a change in prosecutors primarily due to these 
investigations. Flexibility in the law provided the justification for all of these politically 
motivated decisions. As will be shown through three examples of politically influenced legal 
discretion, international criminal law had to be negotiated for the sake of its own self-
preservation, closely mirroring the logic of exception. 
 
a. Karamira 
The Rwandan genocide’s Karadzic was Colonel Bagosora – allegedly the architect of the 
interhamwe and the de facto decision maker following the assassination of Habyarimana. 
Unsurprisingly, both the ICTR and the Rwandan government were interested in apprehending 
him, but the RPF had took measures to put Bagosora on trial long before the ICTR identified him 
as a target of investigation. Bagosora was arrested in Cameroon in 1996 and the Rwandan and 
Belgium governments quickly filed extradition requests (Peskin 2008:173). Cognizant of the 
primacy of the ICTR, the Cameroonian government transferred him to Arusha, but behind closed 
doors the ICTR prosecutor and the Rwandan government engaged in a furious diplomatic 
disagreement. The RPF was personally insulted by the primacy of the ICTR when it was the 
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Rwandan government spending the resources to locate and arrest Bagosora (Cruvellier 2010:12). 
Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone successfully exerted all the diplomatic pressure he could to 
make arrangements for Bagosora’s extradition, persuading the Rwandan government to succumb 
to his requests in order to secure the tribunal’s most valued defendant. However, the negotiated 
success of the ICTR would not last. 
During the genocide, Frouduald Karamira was the vice president of the ruling political party 
and instrumental to the creation of the interim government after the assassination of 
Habyarimana. A vocal Hutu extremist who coined the term “Hutu Power” in a speech in 1993, 
Karamira was a publicly recognized genocidaire throughout Rwanda (Gourevitch 1998:344). 
Karamira fled to India after the genocide, but after much effort from the Rwandan authorities he 
was extradited to Kigali in June 1996. En route to Rwanda, Karamira attempted an escape at the 
Ethiopian airport and was apprehended by the Ethiopian authorities (Peskin 2008:174). It was 
then that Karamira came to the attention of Prosecutor Goldstone, who filed an extradition 
request to Arusha soon after hearing of the incident. Karamira’s attorney attempted to broker a 
transfer to the tribunal as well, but the Rwandan authorities were determined to see him tried in 
Kigali after their failure with Bagasora. Rwanda privately threatened non-cooperation with the 
prosecutor if he pursued Karamira further, even on some accounts from tribunal officials going 
so far as threatening to not guarantee the safety of investigators within Rwanda (Curvellier 
2010:13). Prosecutor Goldstone had inadvertently stumbled onto a contentious political 
disagreement with the Rwandan authorities he desperately wanted to avoid. On Goldstone’s own 
admission, he would not have pursued Karamira if he was aware of the Rwandan authorities’ 
previous efforts to apprehend him (Peskin 2008:175). Furthermore, the previous ultimatum the 
ICTR made for the extradition of Bagosora made the tug-of-war over Karamira personal for the 
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Rwandan government. Insulted by the ICTR’s dismissal of the Rwandan right to put genocide 
suspects on trial themselves, Karamira provided an opportunity for the RPF to conduct justice on 
its own terms and consolidate the moral high ground in Rwanda. Given the political capital spent 
on securing Bagosora and the ramifications of Rwandan non-cooperation, Prosecutor Goldstone 
bowed to the wishes of the Rwandan authorities and withdrew his extradition request in a matter 
of days. Karamira’s trial in Kigali lasted three days, was sentenced to death, and publically 
executed in 1998 (Peskin 2008:175). 
The Karamira deferral was portrayed as a rational legal determination by the ICTR Office of 
the Prosecutor. Under the ICTR statute, the tribunal can refer a suspect to national jurisdiction 
only if the judiciary can guarantee a fair, impartial proceeding, but this referral is not mandatory 
and the prosecutor has the right to maintain the tribunal’s primacy over any suspect at his or her 
discretion (El Zeidy 2008:208). Most problematic in the case of Karamira, there was plenty of 
evidence suggesting the Rwandan judiciary was not well equipped to conduct a genuine 
proceeding in 1996. Political intimidation of judges and prosecutors, a crippling infrastructural 
deficiency, and a divided social environment would await Karamira upon his return to Rwanda 
(Des Forges and Longman 2004:49), and given that the ICTR had denied Rwandan requests for 
extradition on many prior occasions, the decision to refer Karamira was a questionable legal 
decision disguised as an exceptional calculation of necessity. Richard Goldstone’s own 
description of the affair years later explicitly showcases the exceptional logic behind his 
decision: “politically I don’t think I had any options, it would have been the end of our 
relationship and end of their cooperation” (Cruvellier 2010:13). 
Meanwhile, the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, a mayor of a small Rwandan commune, was set 
to conclude with an almost inevitable conviction. Though the verdict, the tribunal’s first, was 
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instrumental in bolstering the tribunal’s political relevancy, the fact that Akayesu appeared 
before the ICTR and Karamira did not is indicative a manipulative political calculus in 
prosecutorial discretion. Tribunal officials readily admitted that Akayesu’s importance in 
carrying out the Rwandan genocide was minimal (Cruvellier 2010:28). His defense was a whole-
sale denial of an anti-Tutsi genocide and his individual testimony was of no value to future 
proceedings because of his limited involvement (Cruvellier 2010:20-21, 34-35). Karamira, 
though, would have been a valuable source of information in future proceedings (Cruvellier 
2010:14). Although there were significant benefits for the ICTR in seeing him in Arusha, a 
request for a retrial would have destroyed the tribunal’s already fragile diplomatic standing with 
Rwanda. The ICTR Trial Chambers even went so far as to deny a motion from the prosecution to 
allow Karamira to testify in court prior to his execution date – a judicially weak yet politically 
prudential decision that appeased the Rwandan government in order to preserve whatever 
diplomatic relationship the tribunal had left (Cruvellier 2010:14). 
The Akayesu, Bagosora, and Karamira cases are contradictory yet complementary examples 
of a broader paradigm of political negotiation and exception. In all three, questionable legal 
evaluations of criminal responsibility or the capacity of the Rwandan judiciary were used to 
politically expedient ends. The extradition of Bagosora to Arusha was necessary if the ICTR was 
to satisfy its mandate of prosecuting those most responsible for the genocide, but referring 
Karamira, a well-known Hutu Power politician, to Kigali was contrary to this objective. 
Karamira’s testimony alone would have been instrumental in myriad other high-profile cases, yet 
preserving diplomatic relations was valued more, and the statutory requirements were negotiated 
to fulfill this political valuation. Although international criminal law is ideally an apolitical 
arbitration of past events, the ICTR utilized its legal foundation as a court of exception as a tool 
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to justify necessary political decisions. ICTR Statutory requirements of indicting only those most 
responsible are subjective determinations that require little concrete evidence to decide, and in 
conjunction with the Trial Chambers, the prosecution determined the applicability of this legal 
requirement to politically expedient ends (El Zeidy 2008:415). Extraditing Karamira to Arusha 
would have been commensurate with the ICTR’s mandated prosecutorial strategy, but the 
prosecution instead manipulated this calculation of exception to preserve RPF cooperation. 
Feasibly securing a conviction was also an important consideration in selecting cases, and 
Akayesu’s trial was a prioritization of the possibility of conviction that was influenced by the 
tribunal’s political context (Peskin 2008:7-8). All three cases were fundamental political 
calculations entirely within the legal order of the ICTR due to its foundation as a court of 
exception with primary jurisdiction over the Rwandan genocide. Because selectively indicting 
only the most responsible is a determination of exception, it is subject to politically informed 




Although Frouduald Karamira’s extradition battle proved that the Rwandan government 
could leverage prosecutorial discretion in their favor, the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza 
proved that the tribunal’s highest judicial offices could also be motivated by the threat of non-
cooperation. Barayagwiza was a Rwandan diplomat and media executive of the infamous radio 
station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines that incited Rwandans to genocidal murder. As 
a part of the collective trial of two other media moguls charged with incitement to commit 
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genocide, his individual trial was vital to the other two, but on November 3rd, 1999, Barayagwiza 
was unconditionally released due to the violation of his right to habeas corpus. Barayagwiza was 
held in pre-trial detention for almost two years before receiving a formal hearing, a clear 
violation of ICTR standards of due process. What ensued was outrage from the Rwandan public 
and an embarrassing public exposure of prosecutorial incompetence, ultimately leading to a 
politically influenced volte-face in the Appeal Chambers. 
Barayagwiza entanglement with international law began when he was detained in Cameroon 
on May 16th, 1996. Then prosecutor Richard Goldstone notified the Cameroonian government 
that the tribunal did not intend to try him, but the Rwandan and Belgium governments had 
standing requests for extradition drafted prior to his arrest. From March 4th to November 19th 
1997, the Cameroonian government held proceedings on the extradition requests and denied 
them both. The ICTR signed an indictment for him on October 21st, 1997 following Cameroon’s 
authorization of transfer, but Barayagwiza was not transferred to the UN detention facility to 
Arusha until November 19th. Barayagwiza received his formal hearing and pleaded not guilty to 
all charges February 23rd, 1998. He filed a motion to be released immediately that was denied by 
the trial judges, but ultimately granted on appeal on November 3rd 1999. The appeal ordered his 
unconditional release “with prejudice” to the prosecution, meaning Barayagwiza could not be 
arrested on the same charges throughout the lifetime of the tribunal (Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza 
par 108). In the decision, the appeals chamber cited the “egregious” negligence of the Prosecutor 
when he held Barayagwiza in “constructive custody” in Cameroon following the denial of the 
Rwandan and Belgium extradition requests (Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza para 106). Under Rule 
40 of the ICTR statute, the prosecutor had ninety days after his arrest to give a formal 
indictment, which it failed to do (Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza para 106). Secondly, under the same 
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rule, the prosecutor was required to schedule a formal arraignment “without delay,” which the 
appellate judges interpreted in the negative (ICTR art. 20(4), Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza para 
99). This apparent failure by the Prosecutor to uphold his “obligation to prosecute the case with 
due diligence” led the Appeals chamber to demand his immediate release (Prosecutor v. 
Barayagwiza para 99). The Appeal Chambers understood that if it did not adhere to their own 
statutory requirements, the legitimacy of the ICTR as a whole would be irreparably damaged. 
Citing a U.S Supreme Court justice, the appeal decision argued that “if the Government becomes 
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law… To declare that in the administration of the criminal 
law the end justifies the means…would bring terrible retribution” (Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza 
para 111). 
This sparked a diplomatic fury from Kigali, and although the newly appointed prosecutor 
Carla Del Ponte was determined to seek a review of the decision on her own volition, the 
resulting political offensive from the Rwandan government gave her greater urgency. The 
Rwandan government immediately withdrew part of its cooperation in response to 
Barayagwiza’s release by not guaranteeing ordinary privileges for tribunal officials and 
investigators including travel accommodations, security, and logistical support (Peskin 
2008:180). The government even refused Del Ponte a visa to Kigali on her first visit to Arusha 
on November 23rd, 1999 over the matter, putting her on the political defensive due to her non-
existent personal relationship with the RPF (Cruvellier 2010:108). Although the Rwandan 
authorities did not resort to denying witnesses the ability to travel, the message was clear that the 
more drastic measures would be taken if the decision was not overturned. The RPF insisted that 
Barayagwiza’s release was an inexcusable miscarriage of justice for someone complicit in the 
ideological campaign of genocide (Peskin 2008:180). The Appeals chamber, though, saw it 
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fundamentally different. Its decision was a guarantee that the ICTR would adhere to the letter of 
the law that gave the proceedings its legitimacy and integrity (Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza para 
112). Cognizant of the risk of appearing as a victor’s court that manipulates law in an exercise of 
power, the Appeals Chamber stuck to a strict reading of the law and released Barayagwiza on 
international procedural guarantees of judicial fairness. 
Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte was eager to make amends and create constructive 
dialogue with the Rwandan government, and her first decision as prosecutor was to rectify this 
predicament and foster an amiable relationship with the Rwandan government. The RPF, though, 
had appropriated their status of victimhood to shame the tribunal into action, calling public 
attention to the “injustices” of releasing a genocidal ideologue (Des Forges, Longman 2004:55). 
Although the appellate decision was made with the legitimacy of international criminal law in 
mind, it was politically appropriated as doing the exact opposite (ICTR February 22, 2000). 
Press conferences were convened by the Rwandan government that threatened the full 
renunciation of cooperation with the tribunal in an attempt to mobilize political sympathy 
without making a drastic move that might draw the attention of the Security Council. Arbitrating 
this disagreement was left up to a purely legal decision from the Appeals bench, but there was 
plenty of legal flexibility to allow for a politically prudential about-face in international criminal 
law. 
For one, a review of an appeals decision must be predicated on the emergence of new facts 
that were not available at the time of the initial decision. However, the prosecution’s new facts it 
presented in its request for review were facts that were available before Barayagwiza’s initial 
proceeding but were not submitted in pre-trial stages (Cruvellier 2010:110). Furthermore, the 
ICTR was a combination of civil and common law judges, which allowed for a broad 
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interpretation in the case of procedural rules. Common law systems are based on two sides of a 
case with a neutral third party deciding the validity of each argument, and violations of the 
accused right’s almost always demand a full dismissal of the case. Civil law systems, on the 
other hand, have more inclusive evidentiary practices with a judge taking an active role before 
adjudicating. The civil law tradition usually factors in violations of the accused’s rights after 
deciding guilt either by mitigating the sentence or giving monetary compensation in the event of 
an acquittal. Luckily for the prosecution, the decision to release Barayagwiza was made by an 
outgoing American judge well practiced in a common law tradition. Replacing him would be a 
French judge sympathetic to civil law, and the Swiss civil law prosecutor Del Ponte sought to 
appeal to his legal training in her motion to review the decision (Del Ponte 2009:80-81). 
The Appeals chamber made the exceptional choice of traveling to Arusha from The Hague to 
decide the prosecution’s request for review, an obvious way of appealing to the political wishes 
of Rwandan authorities who filed an amicus brief on behalf of the prosecutor (Peskin 2008:182). 
The decision was ultimately reversed on March 31st, 2000, and luckily for the ICTR, 
Barayagwiza was already lawfully detained pending his potential requests of asylum. In the 
revised decision, Barayagwiza’s sentence would be reduced if he was convicted or he would be 
monetarily compensated in the case of acquittal – the exact outcome Del Ponte hoped for. The 
reversal might have temporarily repaired the friction between the Rwandan government and the 
tribunal, but the legitimacy of international legal procedure and the defense’s statutory rights 
were violated in the process. Although it might have been unconscionable to some to have a 
possible architect of the genocide let free on prosecutorial incompetence, statutory rules of due 
process ensure a fair and impartial trial. Moreover, the revised decision completely reversed all 
normative arguments of support for the initial decision of release. The Rwandan government 
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made sure to demonstrate the ramifications an unconditional release would have on the future of 
the tribunal (Peskin 2008:183), and the Appeals chamber used a weak legal interpretation based 
on the difference of legal tradition to achieve a politically expedient end, completely reversing its 
previous statements of support for preserving the legal integrity of the ICTR (Prosecutor v. 
Barayagwiza para 112).  
The tribunal’s positive law was subordinate to the calculative necessity of preserving its 
exceptional intervention, and although the letter of the law should have ideally regulated political 
motivations, the exceptional nature of international criminal law influenced all aspects of legal 
interpretation. Rwandan cooperation had to be preserved at all costs, and the potential risk posed 
by non-cooperation demanded the Appeals Chamber interpret the infringement of Barayagwiza’s 
right to due process according to the whole exceptional enterprise of the tribunal.  
 
c. The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) 
During the RPF invasion of April 1994, the predominately Tutsi invading forces were 
confronted with destruction of unimaginable scope. Villages were scorched, entire families 
massacred, and the perpetrators were on the run all the while the invading Tutsi diaspora, with a 
minor contingent of Hutu oppositionists, spread throughout Rwanda to save lives and seek 
justice. The RPF understandably wanted stability as well as vengeance, and in the weeks during 
and following the genocide, RPF forces committed atrocities against alleged Hutu Power 
sympathizers and fleeing masses of refugees. Evidence of indiscriminate massacres of civilians 
attempting to cross Rwandan borders, systematic summary executions of accused Hutu Power 
supporters, forced internal displacement of populations into internment camps to separate 
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criminals from civilians, and interference with investigators were gathered by the UN, the 
UNHCR, and other humanitarian organizations (Haskell and Waldorf 2011:52-53, Des Forges 
1999:705,726). The UN Commission of Inquiry in September 1994 explicitly mentioned RPF 
atrocities and recommended UN prosecution of these crimes alongside crimes of genocide 
(UNSC Final Report para 95). In total, 25,000 to 30,000 people were allegedly killed or executed 
by the RPF from April to September of 1994 when international scrutiny coincided with their 
dramatic decrease (Des Forges 1999:702-735). Although there is no moral equivalence relative 
to the genocide that preceded these killings, there is convincing documentary, forensic, and 
testimonial evidence to indicate that this was a widespread, systematic, and ethnically motivated 
campaign by the RPF leadership to consolidate power (UNSC Final Report para 97, Des Forges 
1999:734). Virtually all persons killed in this campaign were Hutus, and there is evidence that 
mentions the use of identity cards and forced civilian confessions to single out individuals for 
execution (Des Forges 1999:693, 706). 
The tribunal from the outset was tasked with the responsibility of investigating these crimes 
along with crimes of genocide perpetrated by Hutu Power combatants and officials. The UN 
Commission of Inquiry explicitly mentioned the need for a tribunal to prosecute individuals 
responsible on both sides, and the RPF was aware that the mandate of the tribunal potentially 
incriminated them. Early ICTR investigation teams were followed by government security and 
surveillance personnel to ensure investigators were not gathering the wrong evidence (Del Ponte 
2009:76). International interference, questioning of researchers, limiting the travel of foreign 
journalists, and a limited disclosure of information prevailed in the months following the 
genocide, and although the RPF claimed those responsible were “renegade soldiers” that were in 
the process of being held accountable, there was no effort to investigate the complicity of those 
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in leadership positions (Des Forges 1999:723-724). Prosecutions against RPF soldiers in Rwanda 
accounted for approximately one hundred out of the alleged thirty thousand deaths the military 
was allegedly responsible for (Haskell and Waldorf 2011:53).  It is understandable why the RPF 
leadership has remained immune from legal scrutiny. The de facto head of state and official vice 
president at the end of the genocide Paul Kagame relied on the military, and protecting his senior 
officers, including himself, was necessary in his ascent to power (Del Ponte 1999:186). 
In December 2000, Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte announced the initial stages of her 
“special investigations” into the RPF (ICTR December 13, 2000). Del Ponte interpreted the legal 
mandate of the ICTR to be based on impartiality and the accompanying risk of impunity. If the 
Rwandan government was kept out of the dock when the ICTR was the only legal institution 
capable of prosecuting them, she argued, the legacy of international law and international 
governance in general would suffer (New York Times 2003). Moreover, the domestic Rwandan 
population and the international diaspora was greatly conflicted over who should be held 
responsible, and prosecuting the RPF would have arguably contributed to the reconciliation and 
social rehabilitation of a fractured Rwandan society. By the time of Del Ponte’s announcement, 
though, the ICTR had completed only eight cases, three of which were pre-trial plea bargains. 
International donors were mobilizing to restrict the mandate of the tribunal to ensure more 
expedient proceedings, and the UN and donor governments feared that investigating the RPF 
would prolong the already unpopular and publically irrelevant judiciary. Knowing the logistical 
limitations of the tribunal, Del Ponte engaged in a close dialogue with Kagame and Rwandan 
judicial authorities from the beginning (Haskell and Waldorf 2011:56). Access to military 
records and governmental officials would be vital for a strong investigation, and Del Ponte was 
fully aware that without the cooperation of the Rwandan government, the investigations would 
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fail. Initially, Kagame granted Del Ponte access to military records, but senior ranking military 
officers continually refused the tribunal’s request even after his explicit demands of cooperation 
(Del Ponte 2009:184). Moreover, the ICTR had been infiltrated and closely monitored by the 
RPF. Witnesses who provided testimony for the prosecution gave the same information to 
government informants, the RPF was allegedly reading the ICTR’s mail, and employees within 
the tribunal kept the government informed of the progress of the investigations (Peskin 
2008:190). The investigation team’s safety in Kigali was also threatened by increasing social 
animosities against the ICTR. Survivor group boycotts and government sponsored protests 
forced the team to withdraw from Kigali, foreshadowing what was to happen when the Rwandan 
government viewed its political position strong enough to resort to blackmail (Haskell and 
Waldorf 2011:56). 
On June 7th, 2002, witnesses boarding a plane to Arusha to testify were stopped from flying 
because of missing piece of paperwork. As it turns out, this arbitrary change in Rwandan travel 
policy was intentionally fabricated by the RPF, and attempts at retrieving the necessary 
documentation were made impossible (Peskin 2008:203). The tribunal was no longer the sole 
authority in the international contestation for compliance, and as a result two ongoing trials were 
forced to adjourn until October (Peskin 2008:215). Del Ponte continually pursued a strategy of 
private negotiation, imploring Kagame to uphold his legal obligations. The ICTR never publicly 
shamed the UN into action in the coming weeks either through trial judgments that implicated 
the willful interference of the Rwandan government or press conferences. Del Ponte’s last 
meeting with Kagame on June 28th consisted of only his forceful and direct affirmation of non-
compliance, and shortly thereafter the RPF investigations were secretly suspended by the Office 
of the Prosecutor (Cruvellier 2010:161, Del Ponte 2009:226). The only recourse the ICTR could 
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take was lodging a formal complaint with the UN Security Council, which it did on July 23rd 
hoping that the UN would take aggressive measures to coerce Kagame into compliance 
(Moghalu 2002b:298). However, the Security Council issued only a reminder of Rwanda’s 
international legal obligations of cooperation among many other points in a resolution six 
months later with no resolve to pressure the RPF regime (UNSC res 1503). Rwanda slowly 
allowed the travel of witnesses later in 2002, but the message had been well received and the 
investigations would inevitably stop given the lack of government documents and intimidation of 
witnesses fearful of defying the RPF. 
Del Ponte was removed from her office of Chief Prosecutor for the ICTR in July 2003 as a 
product of a deal brokered by the Rwandan government, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom (Graubart 2010:418). The UN created two separate prosecutors for the ICTY and the 
ICTR by citing the need to expedite proceedings and close down the tribunal by 2010. This 
demand for expediency will be discussed in more depth later, but it is doubtful that the RPF 
investigations and the resulting willful non-compliance of the Rwandan government were not the 
primary motivations for the decision. A changing of the guard would ensure the investigations 
would not last and that expediency would be prioritized above the need for comprehensive and 
impartial judicial proceedings (Del Ponte 2009:238-239). As previously discussed, the 
prosecutor had a great deal of discretion in deciding cases and indictments, and restricting the 
ICTR mandate allowed for an expansion of political calculations in the investigative stage. Del 
Ponte’s successor Hassan Bubacar Jallow proclaimed after Del Ponte’s resignation that the 
tribunal’s focus would shift more towards the gravest crimes and the highest ranking defendants.  
Arguably, the risk of RPF impunity could obligate an ICTR investigation. They are the ruling 
party in government and will be for the foreseeable future, and not making the RPF accountable 
66 
 
in a court of law will create a more divisive Rwandan society and a precedent that international 
criminal law can be politically manipulated through non-compliance. Jallow, though, claimed 
that the relative gravity of genocide cases and the resource limitations of the tribunal compelled 
his office to drop the ‘special investigations’ (Peskin 2008:227). Gravity was the legal veil 
behind the politically prudential decision from the prosecution that allowed RPF impunity to 
prevail.  
In 2008, Jallow referred evidence of Del Ponte’s ‘special investigations’ to Rwanda for 
domestic prosecution, ironically days after the Trial Chambers denied a similar referral request in 
a genocide case (Haskell and Waldorf 2011:59-60). A high profile case regarding the massacre 
of the archbishop of Kigali and several other clergymen by a number of RPF soldiers was given 
to the Rwandan state prosecutor, ultimately ending in a politically tainted judicial proceeding. 
The state prosecutor never attempted to contradict defense testimony, exculpatory evidence was 
not admitted, and prosecution witness testimony was highly disjointed. As a result, two 
commanding RPF officers were acquitted and two subordinate officers were convicted of murder 
and sentenced to six years in prison, later reduced to five on appeal (Haskell and Waldorf 
2011:61-70). The judge denied any systematic nature of the crimes and argued the killing of the 
archbishop was an isolated event caused by understandable feelings of grief and revenge. ICTR 
trial observers accepted the fairness of the trial without providing any supporting evidence, 
although the Rwandan prosecutor never intended to “diligently prosecute” the case, potentially 
mandating a retrial in Arusha (Haskell and Waldorf 2011:69). The RPF investigations were 
officially closed shortly thereafter. 
Prosecutorial discretion on gravity, judicial interpretation on domestic referrals, the threat of 
non-compliance, and logistical limitations all influenced a legal justification of the politically 
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expedient decision to drop the RPF investigations (Cruvellier 2010:163). Although international 
criminal law could have benefited from the appearance of impartiality in adjudicating both RPF 
and Hutu Power atrocities, the entire enterprise was politically threatened if the ICTR pushed for 
RPF indictments (Haskell and Waldorf 2011:84). Positive law justified a comfortable diplomatic 
resolution through the manipulation of threshold determinations of exception, notably the notion 
of relative criminal gravity. The ICTR’s survival was at stake, and the Rwandan government 
successfully forced the prosecutor to adopt a more pragmatic cost-benefit valuation, pitting the 
impartial application of the law against ensuring the self-preservation of the tribunal as a whole. 
The ICTR ended up allowing political exceptions to the ICTR’s legal mandate by acting out of 
perceived political necessity. This calculation is wholly within the legal parameters of the ICTR, 
and although the application of law in Arusha initially hoped to be impartial and apolitical, the 
tribunal was a politically weak legal body that required its exceptional practice of law be flexible 
according to political contingencies. 
 
Expediency 
 International criminal law takes a great deal of patience and money to work effectively. 
As discussed previously, the tribunal was ill-equipped for a meaningful prosecution of the Hutu 
Power rank-and-file. The caseload was enormous, and the tribunal would inevitably have to be 
selective in its indictments. Most importantly, the ICTR was beholden to the pocketbooks and 
political resolve of international donors and the United Nations (Akahavan 1996:510). The UN 
legal regime at the establishment of the ICTR was already invested in legal diplomacy in the 
Balkans, and although the precedent of the ICTY initially expedited the proceedings in Arusha, it 
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limited the willingness to expend more financial resources than necessary. The decision to share 
a prosecutor and appellate court was a choice justified by a concern for consistent case law and 
unnecessary financial expenditures, though in doing so efficiency and prosecutorial expertise 
were initially thrown to the wind. Having to divide his or her time between The Hague and 
Arusha, the Chief Prosecutor never had a close familiarity with Rwandan history or politics 
before he or she was appointed (Des Forges, Longman 2004:53). In the case of Carla Del Ponte, 
she had never travelled to Africa before her appointment and had no prior briefings on the 
Rwandan genocide before her first day in office (Del Ponte 2009:64). Moreover, the ICTY had 
advisors to the prosecutor on the UN’s payroll for consultation on Balkan history, politics, and 
domestic law which were never hired for the ICTR (Peskin 2008:212). Inefficiency was bound to 
affect the ICTR from the beginning, but it was not until a decade into the tribunal’s lifetime did 
this drastically alter the application of positive law. 
Arusha was also a poorly placed site for an efficient legal bureaucracy. Although 
important to the symbolism of international diplomacy, Arusha was lacking in its most basic 
infrastructure to properly function as a seat of international justice (Del Ponte 2009:70-71). The 
vacated government offices, motels, detention facilities, and safe houses in and around Arusha 
that would become the ICTR lacked the necessary telecommunication infrastructure for efficient 
communications within the tribunal and with the UN (Des Forges, Longman 2004:53). Judges 
were underpaid, support staff was hard to recruit due to low financial incentives, and courtrooms 
were ill-equipped with the necessary technology for translation and witness protection 
mechanisms. Carla Del Ponte attempted to move the ICTR to Kigali during her term, but Arusha 
had already relied upon the business the tribunal provided (Del Ponte 2009:138). Removing it 
would have not only been unduly expensive for the UN but also would have left the Arusha 
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service industry to wither away. A truck stop in arid Northern Tanzania had now turned into a 
site of international legal humanitarianism, and because of this attention, it received a large 
influx of direct infrastructural investment that would not have been built if the tribunal had been 
placed elsewhere. 
 The inefficiencies and inadequacies of the ICTR were imposed by the international body 
that created it, but international efforts to foster reconciliation in Arusha were becoming more 
removed from the events in Rwanda a decade after the ICTR’s creation (Morris 1997:355). 
Attempts by the Security Council to appoint new judges, improve administrative efficiency, and 
infrastructural conditions in Arusha came many years after the tribunal was established, and in 
the early 2000s when the tribunal finally began to reap the rewards of this ex post facto financial 
support the issue of judicial expediency become an important consideration in the ICTR’s legal 
proceedings. In 2003, the ICTY had already developed a completion strategy that aimed to 
conclude all of its work by 2010 (UNSC 1503). Given that at the time the ICTR had tried merely 
21 detainees at an estimated cost of 100 million dollars per completed case, the United Nations 
demanded a more efficient return on its investment (Oomen 2005:896). UNSC resolution 1503 
was adopted in August 2003 mandating the ICTR follow in the ICTY’s footsteps in ending all 
investigation by 2004, all trial activities by 2008, and all appellate proceedings by 2010 (UNSC 
2003).  
This completion strategy would be pursued through numerous means, one of which was 
to focus investigations solely on the “most senior leaders” or those “most responsible” for 
serious breaches of international law (UNSC 2003). As discussed previously, this granted an 
increased amount of discretion to the prosecution. For one, the prosecution did not need to justify 
its refusal to issue an indictment to any oversight body in citing this threshold of criminal 
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responsibility. Determining the sufficient gravity of each case is under the prosecutor’s 
discretion alone, and due to the fact that the prosecution was the branch of the tribunal most 
subject to the political contestation over state cooperation, this consideration was often used to 
justify politically expedient calculations of self-preservation. RPF investigations and other 
politically sensitive issues were avoided through the utilization of this prosecutorial limitation on 
high level targets. Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow’s justified his investigative decision to end 
investigations on the RPF, for example, because the completion supposedly limited his 
investigative discretion, but he is not entirely correct (Peskin 2008:227). The completion strategy 
introduced an added element of negotiation to the legal proceedings. Interests of expediency now 
had to be balanced against the interpretation of law, emerging criminal precedent, and the values 
of a particular case to the tribunal. The extra consideration of expediency were an added element 
in the prosecution’s independent discretion to decide what cases to admit, giving the Prosecutor 
flexibility in his or her subjective interpretation based on what is necessary in the whole 
exceptional enterprise of the ICTR. 
The issue of concurrent jurisdiction is the secondary component to the ICTR completion 
strategy. Rule 11 bis of the ICTR statue allows for the referral of crimes of lesser significance to 
domestic jurisdictions, later amended to facilitate in the implementation of the completion 
strategy (El Zeidy 2008:405). However, the ICTR jurisdiction was primary to domestic 
jurisdictions, meaning that Trial Chamber decisions on the referral of cases are the final authority 
in terms of defining the threshold of what are admissible and what cases should be referred back 
to the Rwandan judiciary (ICTR art. 8, Morris 1997:365). The tribunal may order the referral 
either through judicial order of trial judges or prosecutorial request, but a referral can only be 
granted by the Trial Chambers if the state can guarantee the defendant a fair and genuine 
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proceeding as well as precluding the possibility of the death penalty. This decision can also be 
revoked by the ICTR anytime the defendant’s trial is deemed unfair or politically compromised 
without having to recognize an appeal from the Rwandan government (Morris 1997:366). The 
death penalty eliminated any possibility of referral back to Rwanda before it was abolished in 
2007 – an obvious attempt to reclaim its control over genocide cases (Haskell and Waldorf 
2011:80). Applying Rule 11 bis, though, ultimately depends on judging the competency and 
fairness of the judiciary the accused will be referred to. Rwandan judicial bodies were under 
increased scrutiny through the establishment of the UN completion strategy; judicial 
manipulation by the ruling RPF party pervaded, genocide cases often had no willing defense 
witnesses, and the rights of the accused were frequently violated under international customary 
norms, especially in cases against the RPF (Human Rights Watch). The ICTR rarely exercised its 
ability to refer cases back to Rwanda until Hassan Bubacar Jallow’s tenure and the abolishment 
of the death penalty, and even then such decisions were questionable. The referral of the murder 
of the Archbishop of Kigali by the RPF, for example, resulted in verdicts that would not hold up 
to international standards, not to mention days before the referral the ICTR Trial Chambers 
denied the same request of a similar case on concerns of procedural fairness and judicial 
impartiality (Haskell and Waldorf 2011:60). What this case, and many others, indicate is that 
criteria for the implementation of Rule 11 bis was negotiated around the political context, 
namely Rwandan non-compliance, Security Council demands for more efficient proceedings, 
and the protection of high profile cases for the betterment of international criminal law. 
There are valid moral and practical arguments for the demand for expedient judicial 
proceedings. Separating the punishment from the crime in a long drawn out judicial proceeding 
does little, if anything, to further the aim of deterring future respect for universal human rights 
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(Rudolph 2001:664). Moreover, the domestic judicial context may not benefit from a trial 
inundated with procedural formalities and long proceedings that only aim to serve international 
criminal law rather than the society it ostensibly assists (Morris 1997:363). Yet, it is unrealistic 
to assume the adjudication of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity could or even 
should be a quick exercise of justice. Law is designed to be a diligent and thorough exercise in 
assigning guilt impartially through the adjudication of truth. If the law is subject to the whims of 
demands for efficiency, then it has been compromised.  
Demands for efficiency alter law’s purpose, and in the case of the ICTR, the completion 
strategy was implemented not for the purpose of improving international or domestic rule of law 
but solely for the political interests of the United Nations. Slow, ineffective justice was the 
subject of intense criticism from the international press, and Arusha epitomized a well-
intentioned yet incompetent response to mass suffering that had little relevancy to post-genocide 
development in Rwanda (Moghalu 2002a:32-34). The completion strategy ended up becoming a 
means to justify politically motivated prosecutorial decisions at the ICTR, and in the process 
politically impartial judgments on Rule 11 bis based on strict statutory requirements were thrown 
to the wayside. The ICTR had no obligation to refer cases back to Rwanda, and even if the 
Rwandan judiciary could have gained custody under statutory guidelines, the tribunal frequently 
decided against it when doing so would be contrary to the enterprise of international legal 
judgment (Morris 1997:373). The completion strategy is but one of many examples in 
international criminal law of a legal mandate that allows for political manipulation because it is 
inherently an extra-juridical calculation of exception. As it stands now, the ICTR did not 
conclude its investigations until 2008 and aims to conclude all appellate activities by the end of 
2014. Expediency will continue to be a criticism of international criminal law for years to come, 
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but the case of the ICTR should demonstrate that demanding quicker proceedings introduces 
greater political discretion through the veil of positive law. Expediency is an exceptional 
consideration and as such open to political manipulation. 
 
IV. The International Criminal Court (ICC) Situation in Northern 
Uganda 
Background 
Unlike Rwanda, Uganda’s historical and political divergences are indirect rather than 
direct colonial influences. Its northern region was devastated by raiders from the Upper Nile 
region during the mid-nineteenth century. Nubi soldiers from Egypt and raiders from the 
Sudanese region of Khartoum frequently pillaged the border regions of northern Uganda for 
slaves, ivory, and sexual gratification (Allen 2008:25). The Uganda-Sudan border was a war 
zone for many years before the colonial occupation, and when possible, people sought the 
protection of local war lords who were able to exchange assurances of security for money (Allen 
2008:25-26). These mercenaries and their descendants came to forge a pattern of patronage and a 
history of loyalty to local military leaders. It was not until the violently imposed stability 
following the establishment of the British Protectorate in 1900 that these settlement patterns 
became classified as ‘tribes’ for the administration of British indirect rule (Allen 2008:26). 
Where they did not exist, they were created and concentrated into respective administrative 
zones for convenience sake, effectively engraining ‘tribal’ divisions into the social context 
although many spoke the same language and shared similar cultural practices. Groups such as the 
Acholi, Langi, and Alur, who all spoke the same Lwo language, were split by the border between 
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Sudan and Uganda and divided up along arbitrary colonial districts. Institutionalized divisions 
throughout the nation created a fragmented social structure throughout Uganda that has since 
taken on a dangerous ethnic or ‘tribal’ character. Moreover, the different colonial administrative 
strategies between the north and the south endured and the resulting geopolitical animosities 
negatively affected stability after Uganda’s independence in 1962. 
Internal divisions between north and south Uganda grew along these fabricated ethnic 
lines following independence. Milton Obote, a northerner, was installed as Uganda’s first head of 
state with the help of the outgoing British government in a tactical maneuver to protect British 
interests after independence. He gained legitimacy with a hard fist, securing electoral and 
military support from the armed forces dominated by his allegiances with fellow northerners 
partly due to the fact that Britain had created a political infrastructure to suppress the politically 
and economically powerful southern population (Allen 2008:28). Over time, Obote grew 
increasingly dictatorial, fighting battles with regions accustom to a degree of regional autonomy 
in order to consolidate his power. His alliance with the military proved his undoing, however, 
when he was forced into exile after a military coup by his influential, powerful, and maniacal 
General Idi Amin in 1971. 
The Amin regime is well known for its dictatorial horror. Important to this context is his 
regional patronage. Amin’s power base was in the northwest, and his first objective was to gain 
favor from southerners and eliminate the threat posed by Obote loyalists in the north in order to 
preserve his own power (Allen 2008:28-29). He achieved both by drawing from southern 
animosity for the northern population and forcibly removing all Lwo-speakers from the armed 
forces, in many instances massacring thousands. Some of those that managed to flee across 
international borders formed a rebel forced called the Ugandan National Liberation Army 
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(UNLA), and following Amin’s invasion into Tanzania in 1979, the movement seized an 
opportunity to overthrow Amin with the help of the Tanzanian army. Future president Yoweri 
Museveni was one of the most popular commanders of the affiliated forces that forced Idi Amin 
out of Uganda (Allen 2008:29). 
Elections organized in 1980 failed to resolve regional divisions, appearing to many as 
being rigged in favor of previously ousted president Milton Obote. Anti-Amin sympathizers in 
the south and southwest refused to accept the results given Obote’s allegiances in the north, 
Museveni among them. Museveni retreated into the bush in 1981 with a small group of followers 
and formed the National Resistance Army (NRA) to start a guerilla war in northern Uganda. 
Obote still relied on the Acholi and Langi populated UNLA, which forced many civilians in the 
northwest into Sudan as refugees or were rounded up indiscriminately into camps and killed, the 
number of dead ranging in the thousands (Allen 2008:29-30). Obote, though, was overthrown 
again from within his own ranks after Acholi soldiers acted against him on the belief that they 
were undeservedly bearing the brunt of the fighting for Obote’s own personal interests (Allen 
2008:30). Acholi soldiers seized power in 1985 and installed Tito Okello as president. He 
immediately began negotiations with Museveni and signed a peace agreement days into his 
presidency. However, this effort came too late, and as the NRA came closer to military victory 
Museveni decided to ignore the agreement and march onto Kampala in 1986 where Museveni 
seized the presidency. This final transition of leadership would shape Uganda’s history for the 
next three decades. Many Acholi people retreated to their home region in the north fearful of 
revenge from the NRA harboring a deep resentment against Museveni for what they perceived as 
breaking their trust (Allen 2008:30). 
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UNLA oppression against the Acholi continued in the first stages of Museveni’s regime 
leading many to join rebel forces aligned with the Sudanese government. Former UNLA soldiers 
loyal to Obote, generally Acholi, formed the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) – a 
move predicted by Museveni who continued to engage in cross-border and domestic warfare 
against perceived enemies and sympathizers (Akhavan 2005:406). However, Museveni did not 
predict that these anti-government forces would become closely associated with spirit mediums. 
A notable cult led by an Acholi diviner Alice Auma Lakwena, named for the spirit that allegedly 
possesses her, performed healing rituals on the defeated UNLA soldiers – a deeply historical 
practice in northern Uganda that has been influenced by Christian missionaries in the region, 
particularly the Pentecostal movement (Allen 2008:30-35). She would cast out polluting spirits 
from defeated UNLA soldiers and preach that only war would heal them. Her Christian 
influenced rituals were said to purify people polluted by bad spirits, and she led what she 
claimed to be 18,000 soldiers south in a marauding crusade in late 1986 under the name the Holy 
Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) (Allen 2008:35). Before battle, Alice would anoint her followers 
with crude oil and her soldiers would march into battle naked brandishing Bibles and 
Kalashnikovs, confusing her enemies and achieving a good deal of success in her campaign 
against Museveni (Allen 2008:35). They were stopped short of Kampala after an overwhelming 
military defeat at the hands of the Ugandan military (Akhavan 2005:406). Those that survived 
fled north, and Alice managed to escape on a bicycle and has been living in a refugee camp in 
Kenya ever since. 
The UPDA military forces based in south Sudan were drawn into negotiations in 1988, 
but those who refused to accept defeat joined a number of armed groups inspired by Alice Auma 
Lakwena, the most important being one led by Joseph Kony (Allen 2008:36). Similar to Alice, 
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Kony is a trained spirit medium who claims to be frequented by a dangerous and powerful spirit 
propelling him towards violence (Allen 2008:37-39). The UPDA’s most senior commanders 
joined Kony’s movement and organized the military force alongside Kony’s ideological focus on 
spirit purification and divination. By 1990, Kony’s force was the only significant armed 
movement fighting in the Acholi dominate northern region, and later that year Kony named his 
force the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (Allen 2008:39). 
Kony also claimed that violence would purify his followers, but the brutality practiced by 
the LRA surpassed any of his predecessors. The LRA was led by the spiritual guidance of Kony 
who directs his followers anywhere his possessing spirit chooses to lead them. The LRA, though, 
was prone to target Kony’s native Acholi population in order to incite fear and support for his 
armed struggle against Museveni. Their tactics were well known for their scale and nature. 
Children were frequently abducted as the movement’s primary soldiers, many of which were 
required to kill their own families as an initiation ceremony (Akhavan 2005:407-408). They were 
then forced into combat and quickly became brainwashed into the movement until adulthood. 
Some were released at a moment’s notice, furthering the perception of fear and unpredictability 
that Kony desires (Allen 2008:42). It is estimated that from the beginning of ICC temporal 
jurisdiction in July 1st, 2002 to August 2004, the LRA abducted 12,000 Ugandan children in 
addition to the 26,615 more abductions the Ugandan government collected data on prior to 2001 
(Akhavan 2005:407). Women were kidnapped and offered as sexual slaves to LRA soldiers at 
Kony’s discretion. Those who spoke out against the LRA, attempted to escape, or fought back 
were kidnapped and maimed according to their actions. Lips, arms, legs, and breasts were cut 
off, sometimes at the hands of abducted children who were later released and ostracized from 
their community. The LRA has publically expressed a political agenda for their movement, 
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primary of which is the removal of Museveni, unconditional amnesty, and a restructuring of the 
government (Akhavan 2005:407).  
Kony’s political motives were questionable, though. Kony wanted the LRA to be taken 
seriously as both a military threat and a movement with populist support, and his political 
demands made it more difficult for the Ugandan government to outright discredit the LRA (Allen 
2008:43). What was clear, though, is that the LRA ruthlessly engaged in a brutal twenty year-
long terror campaign against his own population to secure fear, respect, and military resources in 
order to continue his insurgency. The motive, however, still remains debatable. 
The Ugandan military has employed numerous measures to counter the LRA insurgency, 
many of which were devastating to the Ugandan population. After signing the peace agreement 
with the UPDA, Museveni publically claimed that the war in the north had ended once and for 
all, a position that found its expression in the appointment of an Acholi women Betty Bigombe 
as Minister of State for Pacification of Northern Uganda, a direct insult on Acholi masculinity 
and a means to showcase Museveni’s apparent control over the northern population (Allen 
2008:44-47). However, as the insurgency continued to the dismay of Museveni, he resorted to 
more drastic military measures alongside using Bigombe as a mediator for peace negotiations. In 
1991, the NRA launched a four-month military campaign called Operation North, the primary 
effect though was to antagonize and alienate non-combatants from the LRA (Allen 2008:47). As 
the anti-insurgency measures became stronger, the LRA responded with more force. Alleged 
government collaborators were maimed and killed, conspirators tortured and amputated, and ill-
equipped government resourced community defense groups called ‘arrow brigades’ suffered 
large casualties. This reactive military strategy would become a recurring theme for the LRA 
insurgency. In 1994, Bigombe managed to arrange an uneasy ceasefire with the LRA and 
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remained open to negotiations in the foreseeable future. However, only a few weeks later 
Museveni publically humiliated Bigombe and the LRA by betraying the peace agreement and 
issuing an ultimatum to the rebels to lay down their arms within seven days (Allen 2008:48). 
Killings resumed after three days, and ever since Museveni has been unenthusiastic about a 
peace settlement and preferred a military solution (ICG 2005:4). Museveni contended that the 
LRA was using the peace negotiation to regain their military capacity and continue their 
insurgency with greater force – an argument that Museveni used in future peace negotiations and 
the ICC used to publically justify legal action instead of first waiting for a peace agreement 
(Ocampo 2006). 
Museveni’s military strategy had a significant political advantage. President Museveni is 
from the southwest where his electoral base remains to this day (Allen 2008:48). The internal 
divide between north and south Uganda, although pre-colonial in its origins, was exacerbated 
following the oppressive Obote, Amin, and Okello regimes, all of which had political patronage 
in northern districts. Museveni appropriated this fact by guaranteeing the protection of 
southerners from the excesses of the seemingly barbaric northerners. Museveni used the LRA as 
a political enemy to curry political favor from his southern power base. At the same time many 
senior military officers economically benefitted from cattle rustling and land expropriation in the 
north, prolonging the conflict for personal gain (Allen 2008:49-50). 
The international political incentive to continue the military campaign also a factored into 
Museveni’s reluctance for a peace settlement. LRA rebels were based in southern Sudan, many 
of which gained resources from or joined Khartoum-allied armed groups in the Sudanese civil 
war (Allen 2008:51). The Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was fighting for regional 
autonomy from the Sudanese government and was heavily supported by US and Western 
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European military resources, and the LRA could potentially spoil regional stability by drawing 
the Ugandan military across the border (ICG 2005:3). International pressure increased against 
the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in the late 1990s after the Clinton Administration 
declared it a terrorist state due to its alleged corroboration in an assassination attempt on 
Egyptian president Mubarak and providing a safe haven for Osama bin Laden who was believed 
to have orchestrated the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Allen 2008:50). The 
international ‘war on terror’ gave the Ugandan government a pretext to engage in a just anti-
terrorist campaign against the Sudanese financed LRA. Furthermore, following September 11th, 
2001 and the LRA’s inclusion on the US list of terrorist organizations, this political climate 
continue to favor of Museveni’s prolonged and politically advantageous military strategy 
(Branch 2007:185). 
After the 2002 Ugandan parliamentary elections, Museveni accumulated enough 
government support to officially sanction an aggressive cross-border counter-insurgency against 
the LRA in open cooperation with the SPLA called the Iron Fist Offensive (Allen 2008:50). The 
Ugandan military, renamed the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF), managed to secure US 
logistical support following increased international pressure against the Sudanese government to 
end their cooperation with the LRA and allow the UPDF to engage in military combat on 
Sudanese territory (Akhavan 2005:416). The offensive initially failed to achieve its objectives, 
killing thousands of government defined “rebels” who were primarily LRA abductees, including 
many children (Allen 2008:52). Kony and senior LRA officers evaded capture, outflanked the 
UPDF/SPLA forces, and engaged in a bloody incursion in Northern Uganda as a result. A second 
Iron Fist Offensive launched March 2004 proved to be more effective, forcing the LRA out of 
southern Sudan and deep into central Africa in the border regions of the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo and the Central African Republic where the LRA is reportedly hiding today (Allen 
2008:52). The Sudanese government has continued to assist the LRA with no political cost after 
they were ostracized due to their alleged complicity in the racial pogroms of Darfur in 2004 and 
2005 and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006 that ultimately gave South 
Sudan national independence in 2010. Peace negotiations continued with the LRA which 
eventually catalyzed into the Amnesty Law of 2000 that guaranteed amnesty to any LRA 
combatant who willingly surrendered to the UPDF (Branch 2007:184). The most recent peace 
agreement was signed in the South Sudan capital city Juba in 2007 that resulted in more 
confusion and demands within the Ugandan parliament for further negotiations. LRA 
commanders and Joseph Kony have not given up their insurgency; however, their presence in 
Northern Uganda has been very limited due to the international scrutiny that came as a result of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation in 2004 (ICG 2005:5). 
An integral part of the government’s counter-insurgency strategy since 1996 had been the 
forcible relocation of the northern population into internally displaced person (IDP) camps as a 
part of Operation North (Branch 2007:181). The rationale was that a spread out rural population 
gave more freedom to the LRA, and if the UPDF could control, monitor, and centralize the 
northern population, the LRA would make themselves vulnerable to military capture (Akhavan 
2005:409). However, these camps were devastating to the majority of northern Ugandans who 
were forced or pressured to move. Conditions in the camps were deplorable – mortality rates 
increased astronomically, communicable diseases ravaged entire districts, HIV infection rates 
soared, and close to half a million people were dependent on international food assistance by 
virtue of the government failure to provide adequate relief (Branch 181, Allen 53-60). Some 80% 
of the population of all three Acholi districts lived in ‘protected’ IDP camps, and this only made 
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them more vulnerable to LRA military operations (Allen 53). LRA soldiers would often infiltrate 
camps, abduct children, and kill anyone who strayed too far away from the camp boundaries. 
Children were forced to travel to urban areas at night to protect themselves from abduction while 
the UPDF closely controlled their movements during the day. At the beginning of the ICC 
investigation, the total number of people living in these overcrowded, disease ridden, and 
underfinanced camps was over 1.5 million (Allen 2008:53). Both sides of the conflict were 
implicated in criminal activity, and with the ICC referral came the possibility of a 
comprehensive, impartial investigation that would otherwise not be possible. 
 
 The ICC 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the institutional product of the Rome Statute, 
its founding treaty of statutory laws that followed decades of negotiation, advocacy, and 
compromise. Drafted at the Rome Conference in 1998, it came into effect on July 1st, 2002 after 
60 states had ratified it into national law. A few preliminary points must first be addressed about 
the Rome Statute in general before continuing into specific aspects of its application in Uganda. 
The ICC has jurisdiction only over events that occurred after the Statute was ratified by each 
state party either on the territory of a state party, against a national, or committed by a national. 
Uganda signed the Rome Statute on July 21st, 2002 precluding many notorious atrocities and the 
initial conspiracy of the insurgency and counter-insurgency throughout the twenty year conflict; 
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nevertheless many of the largest massacres committed by the LRA are within this temporal 
limit.8  
By virtue of the Rome Statue’s nature as an international treaty, ICC oversight is subject 
to the consent of each willing state party, but once a state party has signed and ratified the Rome 
Statute into law the ICC can intervene in one of two ways. Either a state can refer a case to the 
Court which then decides if the state is genuinely “unable and unwilling” to prosecute under 
Article 17, or the Prosecutor can intervene on his or her own accord proprio motu after the Pre-
Trial chambers have decided the case reaches the same “unable and unwilling” admissibility 
threshold. The ICC gives priority to national jurisdictions through its administrative principle of 
complementarity. Through this principle, the ICC is a court of last resort in the event that a state 
party is ‘unable’ prosecute due to an infrastructural or security deficiency or the state is 
‘unwilling’ to prosecute because it is shielding the alleged perpetrators (Branch 2007:187). 
Furthermore, the ICC has jurisdiction for only “the most serious crimes of international 
concern,” namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (Rome Statute).9 
Alongside the jurisdictional limits placed on the ICC by the capacity of domestic jurisdictions, 
the ICC also has a subject matter restriction on only the most grave and serious occurrences of 
the above crimes. If the Court finds that an atrocity or human rights violation is not grave enough 
to warrant international prosecution then the ICC will not intervene. The only way a non-state 
party can be subject to ICC jurisdiction is if the United Nations Security Council refers a case to 
the Court. Otherwise, the ICC is an independent organ from the UN and other nation states and 
                                                 
8 The Ugandan government extended the temporal jurisdiction to July 1st, 2002 after signing an agreement with the 
ICC under Article 12(3). 
9 The crime of aggression will also be included under the Rome Statute once a working definition of the crime has 
been agreed upon by the Assembly of State Parties (ASP), the ICC’s legislative body. However, this issue is a 
divisive matter for the many states who have refused to sign the Rome Statute, and it is unlikely the ASP will further 
polarize the Court’s support among recalcitrant powerful nation states by expanding the Court’s jurisdiction. 
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can act on its own accord if it decides a case reaches the legal admissibility threshold enumerated 
in the Article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
Within this legal framework, the ICC is a normative affirmation of the exception. It 
protects national sovereignty as the rule, but in the event that the Court decides a crime passes 
the threshold determination of ‘serious international concern’ and is not or cannot be prosecuted 
domestically, then the ICC intervenes as a last resort. Once a case has been deemed grave 
enough to warrant ICC investigation by the prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chambers, the ICC Office 
of the Prosecutor (OTP) opens up a ‘situation’ where the whole territory of the state in question 
is open to investigation. Within a situation the prosecutor decides the gravest crimes and issues 
indictments to only the most culpable people. In a given situation, the Court will likely issue 
indictments for no more than seven individuals. Thus, the precedent of exception in prosecuting 
only the most gravest crimes and the most responsible perpetrators predominate in the 
Nuremburg and ad-hoc tribunals has been permanently enshrined in international criminal law, 
enabling the same previously mentioned subjective calculation of criminal severity that made the 
ICTR’s operations problematic. The Court is legally required to demonstrate the sufficient 
gravity and the normative necessity of intervention in each case and indictment in order to justify 
its infringement on national sovereignty. Because the ICC is a permanent institution designed to 
handle multiple situations at once, this calculation is relative to the Court’s entire caseload across 
investigations. Gravity, as argued in the previous chapter, is a determination of exception relative 
to other crimes, criminals, and events, and this is augmented manifold in the ICC, which is 
designed to adjudicate many cases at once. Not only are the severity of indictments weighed 
against each other, but situations are admissible relative to the gravity of the Court’s existing 
case load.  
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The Rome Statute has freed international legal intervention from the direct political 
manipulations of international governing bodies, and although the ICC has become master of 
international criminal law’s destiny in this sense, it is still dependent on multilateral and bilateral 
cooperation in every aspect. The ICC is a groundbreaking product of the growing political value 
attributed to international criminal law, but its application still remains the exception vis-à-vis 
the rule of state sovereignty. The most controversial aspect of this relationship is because the 
Court does not have its own police force, it must rely on state parties or international security 
forces to carry out arrest warrants, assist in investigations, gather evidence, and collect witness 
testimony (Akhavan 2005:405). Without support from the UN Security Council, the ICC cannot 
avoid a close relationship with state governments (Allen 2008:91). If the Court does not have 
support from state parties or international military forces, it cannot run an investigation 
(Arsanjani and Reisan 2005:399). This is especially problematic given that the Court can and is 
currently prosecuting sitting heads of state, and the ICC can only operate with the voluntary 
consent of the state under investigation or the help of the UN.10 Although international legal 
intervention at the ICC is strictly speaking a matter of legal admissibility no longer decided by 
the political will of the UN, the ICC is an added element of contentious and complex political 
environments. Taking an exception to state sovereignty remains a generally threatening prospect 
in geopolitical discourse, and the ICC’s legal and moral authority is still limited by the political 
self-interests of state parties. As will be demonstrated in the example of the situation in Northern 
Uganda, how this exceptional supranational intervention is decided upon and manipulated is 
                                                 
10 Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir is charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in 
connection to the events in Darfur in 2004 and 2005. The Sudanese case was the first UN referral to the ICC, but as 
long as Bashir remains inside Sudan or in the protection of non-state parties, his arrest remains unlikely. Kenyan 
president Uhuru Kenyatta is currently on trial for crimes against humanity in connection to the post-election 
violence in Kenya in 2007, but at the time of writing, the prosecution has lost a number of key witnesses and the 
OTP has asked to Trial Chamber to temporarily suspend the trial to reconstruct its case. 
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reactive to its potential effects on the institutional wellbeing of the ICC, the practice of 
international criminal law, and the Court’s relationship to state parties. 
In 2003, President Museveni submitted a referral of a case against the LRA to the ICC. 
The case was deemed admissible by the OTP under Article 17 of the Rome Statute in 2004 
which then initiated a preliminary investigation in Northern Uganda. Museveni’s motives and the 
political and legal implications associated with the referral will be discussed in more depth 
below, but from the beginning it was clear that the referral was a concerted attempt by Museveni 
at galvanizing international support against the public enemy of the Ugandan state. However, 
once the referral was decided admissible by the OTP, the Ugandan government was no longer in 
the position to decide who would be prosecuted meaning the sanctity of the amnesty process 
could not be guaranteed in the future – a calculation Museveni probably did not consider prior to 
referring the case. Uncertainty about the future of the Ugandan Amnesty Law and the possibility 
of future UPDF indictments led to many concerns about the power of a supranational legal 
authority in general, making its investigations in Northern Uganda important for the legitimacy 
of the ICC as a whole. A combination of the ICC’s political weakness and investigative 
uncertainty, though, allowed the Ugandan state to force the Court’s hand in keeping its 
investigations flexible and commensurate with national interests. Because the ICC referral is the 
exception, it can be negotiated around its normative necessity, competing interests, and concerns 
for the Court’s preservation, all of which are fluid and interpreted according to the political 
circumstances. Through an explanation of four interrelated legal issues in the ICC situation in 
Northern Uganda, this chapter will argue that the Rome Statute is embedded in the logic of 
exception in numerous aspects and the ICC, particularly the OTP, uses its laws as an instrument 
for its own self-interests. 
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Chief Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo drafted arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and four other 
senior LRA commanders in early 2005, keeping them under seal for a number of months until 
they were made public in August (Allen 2008:4). Kony and three of the accused remain at large, 
and although there is little expectation the Court will secure arrests in the near future, the 
situation in Uganda – the first formal demonstration of the Court’s power – complicates many of 
the Rome Statute’s core principles and resolving their ambiguities will affect future ICC 
investigations.11 Specific legal and political issues facing the ICC in Uganda will be discussed 
below, all of which demonstrate a calculation of exception on the part of the ICC, namely the 
Office of the Prosecutor. Because the ICC is a young institution with limited precedent and case 
law, the arguments put forward here are deductions from the Court’s actions, press releases, and 
policy papers rather than from a volume legal documentation, as in the previous chapter on the 
ICTR. Like many other ICC situations, the OTP and the Pre-Trial Chambers are the only active 
judicial bodies in the investigations in Northern Uganda. How the Court as a whole (i.e. Trial 
Chambers, Registry, and The Appeal Chambers) will ultimately interpret and apply the Rome 
Statute in Uganda is still unclear. Nevertheless, how the OTP negotiated its legal limitations and 
used its discretionary powers in the initial stages of its investigation is indicative of a general 
logic of exception and has far reaching effects on the ICC and international criminal law. 
Furthermore, because the ICC’s jurisprudence is still developing, its first investigations are all 
the more important for the Court’s legal and political preservation. The idea of a permanent 
international judiciary has been debated for over a century with much reluctance, and now that 
the ICC’s operations are in full swing, international criminal law has all the more to prove. The 
situation in Northern Uganda should demonstrate that the Court’s weak political stature and 
                                                 
11 Deputy Army Commander of the LRA Raska Lukwiya was confirmed dead by the Ugandan government after he 
was killed in a skirmish with the UPDF in April 2006, and the ICC has since withdrawn his arrest warrant. 
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unresolved legal ambiguities provided the means for the OTP to protect the ICC’s investigation 
all the while being as effective as possible in its applying mandate. In its investigations in 
Uganda, the OTP confronts the primary legal and political limitations inherent in the Rome 
Statute. However, the letter of law enables the Court to maintain a degree of flexibility, 
negotiating these limitations around the calculations of necessity inherent in its exceptional 
intervention. The situation in Northern Uganda exemplifies a logic of exception throughout the 
Rome Statute, and the Prosecutor utilized his discretionary powers in manipulating the exception 
in a politically pragmatic manner. This calculation is fluid and subject to a changing 
interpretation of necessity based on the political context, further supporting the argument that 
international criminal law is contingent on political realities and uses its exceptional foundation 
to justify its actions in law. 
 
Referral 
In a public press conference in London on January 29th, 2004, ICC Chief Prosecutor 
Moreno Ocampo and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni announced the referral of the case 
against the LRA to the International Criminal Court, the first such referral in the history of the 
ICC. Ocampo acknowledged soon after that the Court was interested in investigating the LRA 
months before it was referred to by the Ugandan state, and the fact that Ocampo did not pursue 
investigations on his own accord proprio motu is a significant aspect of the Court’s investigation. 
Being an institution dependent on the political will of international governing bodies and its state 
parties, the ICC’s first investigation was destined to be one that was not internationally 
controversial but also an effective means to demonstrate the Court’s capacities (Branch 
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2007:186). The prosecutor’s proprio motu investigative powers are the most controversial aspect 
of the Rome Statute. Many nation-states, most notably the United States, Russia, and China, 
refused to sign the Rome Statute due to apprehensions of an independent prosecutor that liberally 
used his or her independent investigate powers for political motives. The ICC, only two years old 
by the time of the Ugandan referral, had to showcase both its usefulness and acceptance from 
state parties in order to secure cooperative international relationships (Branch 2007:186). After 
all, the Rome Statute is a treaty that states voluntarily consent to and can easily withdraw from. 
Securing more signatories not only bolsters ICC jurisdiction but creates a greater normative 
acceptance for legalist means of intervention. Furthermore, the prosecutor must rely on states to 
secure arrests and conduct investigations, and alienating a state party by using the OTP’s proprio 
motu powers in its first investigation would not benefit the ICC’s political standing nor its 
investigation in Uganda.12 
Having the blessing from the Ugandan government to intervene in a well-publicized 
struggle against terrorism provided an advantage to the ICC’s judicial capacity and political 
image (Branch 2007:752). For one, the ICC could count on a reliable relationship with the 
Ugandan government. The twenty year conflict with the LRA was beginning to question the 
effectiveness of Museveni’s military strategy, and strengthening his resolve in the international 
struggle against terrorism through the ICC was a calculated political benefit. Kony and the LRA 
were hiding in Central Africa, and the possibility of arrest warrants initially offered promise that 
Uganda could gain political and military traction. Secondly, because LRA excesses were 
                                                 
12 The OTP is currently dealing with the effects of its proprio motu powers in its situation in Kenya. The OTP 
utilized this measure in opening up an investigation of the post-election violence in 2007, and the Kenyan 
government has since rallied African states and the African Union around an anti-ICC agenda. The Kenyan 
parliament has most recently passed a resolution to withdrawal from the Rome Statute and is attempting to persuade 
its neighbors to do the same. Ironically, Museveni has voiced his support for the movement although he invited the 
ICC into Uganda in the first place, and there is currently no effort in Uganda to withdraw from the Rome Statute. 
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internationally well known, international legal intervention was not controversial. There was 
wide public support for punitive measures against Kony and senior LRA commanders, but there 
has been little by the way of international action to apprehend them before 2003. By accepting a 
referral from the Ugandan government, the ICC demonstrates its position as a court that respects 
national sovereignty alongside its resolve to end impunity for crimes of ‘international concern.’ 
ICC investigations made the LRA even greater international pariahs, serving the benefit of the 
Ugandan military as well as a weak international court reliant on multilateral support. 
From the outset, though, the referral from President Museveni was problematic to the 
ICC’s appearance of judicial impartiality. First, the Court made a disastrous public relations error 
in appearing with Museveni at a press conference. The public spectacle created the appearance 
that the ICC investigation was an extension of Museveni’s political agenda at a time when the 
ICC needed to display an image of judicial fairness and impartiality the most. The Rome Statute 
does not recognize diplomatic immunity, and although state cooperation is vital asset for the 
Court’s investigation, its operations are supposed to remain independent from all national, 
international, and political institutions. At the time, the second Iron Fist Offensive was 
underway, and many Ugandan and Sudanese citizens feared that an alliance between the Court 
and Museveni sanctioned the UPDF’s ongoing military campaign that was allegedly killing in 
great numbers in South Sudan (Schiff 2008:199).  
Second, Uganda had a fully capable judiciary with a strong political will to prosecute 
Kony and senior LRA commanders (Branch 2007:187). Museveni and Ocampo made clear that 
the Amnesty Law was not going to apply to those culpable for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law in the press conference (Arsanjani and Reisan 2005:394), not to mention the 
2007 Juba Peace Agreement that created special mechanisms within the Ugandan Supreme Court 
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to deal with former LRA combatants (Allen Bitter Roots 2010:242). The ICC’s complementarity 
principle is not designed to be subject to state discretion but rather a normative oversight that 
ensures a state’s political willingness to pursue those responsible for breaches in international 
law (Olasolo2003: 97). The ICC attributes a political value to domestic prosecutions and 
incentivizes them through the threat of intervention (Arsanjani and Reisman 2005:386). 
Voluntarily relinquishing jurisdiction to the ICC renders the Court an instrument for the state’s 
individual interests, and in the case of Uganda, this implication is apparent in many respects. 
Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute stipulates that a state’s inability to prosecute can be 
construed by its inability to obtain the accused (Rome Statute, Policy Paper 2003 4). However, it 
remains unresolved as to how this inability ultimately comes about. In Uganda, the inability to 
obtain Kony is not for a lack of effort or capacity in the judicial branch. The UPDF has 
attempted to secure Kony’s capture for many years, but it is reasonable under the scope of 
Article 17(3) that evasion construes an inability to prosecute and thus a cause for ICC 
jurisdiction (Akhavan 2005:415). Nevertheless, such an inability would not remain if Kony were 
arrested. The referral is valid under Article 17 as long as Kony remains at large, but once he is 
arrested, the Ugandan judiciary is fully capable of issuing a warrant and conducting a fair and 
impartial trial (Akhavan 2005:415). The referral, though, can only be rescinded and a case 
deferred back to the state on appeal (Arsanjani and Riesan 2005:396). Thus, under the Rome 
Statute, the Ugandan state can legally relegate the prosecution of Kony and senior LRA 
commanders to the ICC voluntarily by purposefully not acting (Akhavan 2005:404). This renders 
ICC intervention as an extension of the political calculations of the Ugandan government. 
Uganda has a functional judiciary capable of prosecuting senior LRA commanders, but under the 
Rome Statute, it can choose to not do so and yield to the ICC even after an arrest. The ICC’s 
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position as a court of last resort, though, is incommensurate with this practice of voluntary self-
referral (Arsanjani and Reisman 2005:387). Not only does this notion legally legitimate 
Museveni’s utilization of the ICC to support his military incursion into Sudan, isolate the LRA 
even further, and discredit the peace negotiations he has previously attempted to derail, but it 
also incriminates the purpose of the principle of complementarity upon which the ICC is 
founded. The case against the LRA, though, has a politically pragmatic value for the ICC. They 
had willing cooperation from Uganda, international resolve to bring the LRA to trial, and a 
legally valid case that establishes the efficacy of a fledgling judiciary (Branch 2007:180). The 
Rome Statute protects this political valuation, but the implications for the ICC’s independence 
are troubling. 
Within a judicial institution that relies on state cooperation, it is difficult to maintain an 
appearance of impartiality. As discussed in the previous example of the ICTR, a reliance on state 
cooperation is a political liability that plays to the advantage of the state. In the ICC situation in 
Uganda, initial appearances made it seem as if the referral had implicitly granted the UPDF and 
the Ugandan government immunity from their involvement in the conflict. The first ICC 
documents made no mention of the UPDF, the Ugandan government, or the IDP camps and were 
strictly limited to crimes concerning the LRA (Schiff 2008:200). Although Ocampo clarified his 
mandate to investigate all sides of the conflict shortly after the press conference in 2004, the 
public relations implication of the Ugandan referral remained. Museveni wanted to use the ICC 
for his own political gain, and potential conflicts with the court over peace negotiations, 
amnesty, and military action were bound to surface. Ocampo understood that Museveni could 
withdrawal this cooperation at any time thereby ruining the appearance of state acceptance that 
the referral conveyed (Branch 2007:188). Furthermore, the voluntary referral of Museveni made 
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it seem as if the ICC was filling a judicial void that the Ugandan government deliberately 
created. There is no evidence to suggest that the Ugandan government needs the ICC to 
prosecute the LRA, but merely that it wants it to. The public importance Ocampo placed on 
prosecuting the LRA was a product of the political implications of the referral and the need for 
the Court to secure a cooperative partnership with the Ugandan government. 
Although the referral was an important expression of the principle of complementarity, 
its practical application in Uganda have created the perception that the Court is an extension of 
the national government and subject to its wishes. For one, legal admissibility is a matter for the 
ICC to decide, not the Ugandan government. A referral can be denied if it does not reach the 
admissibility criteria, and it is evident the Ugandan government deliberately minimized its 
normative and legal responsibility to externalize the difficult task of prosecuting the LRA 
(Arsanjani and Reisman 2005:390). This is contrary to the founding principles of the Rome 
Statute. The ICC is an independent judiciary, and if complementarity is subject to political 
manipulation then the ICC’s position of authority in international criminal law is compromised 
(Arsanjani and Reisman 2005:392). However, the pragmatic concerns for the ICC as an 
institution outweigh this risk. The ICC had more to gain in a self-referral in Uganda than it had 
to lose. The referral gave the exceptional intervention of the ICC validity and protected a lasting 
line of cooperation with the Ugandan government in ensuring a universally despised rebel army 
was brought to trial (Arsanjani and Reisman 2005:397). The calculated necessity of these factors 
displaced a concern to ensure the ICC is only used as a last resort as the Rome Statute initially 
intended. Ocampo was willing to manipulate the Rome Statute’s admissibility criteria around the 
political necessities of intervening in Northern Uganda because it strengthened and preserved the 
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ICC’s investigative authority, although the precedent for this self-referral does not bode well for 
the future independence of the prosecution.13 
 
Peace, Amnesty, and ‘The Interests of Justice’ 
The predominant domestic response to the LRA conflict was to persuade combatants to 
surrender with a guarantee of full amnesty. The Amnesty Act of 2000 set up a bureaucratic 
process that allowed all rebels in Ugandan, not just the LRA, to surrender and apply for amnesty. 
If accepted, they were then given formal documentation that protected them from prosecution. 
By the time of the ICC investigation, over five thousand adult LRA combatants had applied 
(Allen 2008:75). Local and international NGOs, the central government, and the LRA 
themselves almost all favored an amnesty process of some form, and from the year 2000 on, the 
Amnesty Act was canonized as the proper and ethical means to end the conflict and foster 
national reconciliation. However, its initial popularity was in a context where the government 
still preferred military operations, which had become increasingly successful in 2002. LRA 
revenge attacks were still common, though, and local civil society organizations were calling for 
a greater resolve to end the military incursion and prioritize peace negotiations that included 
amnesty provisions. Museveni was unwilling to give amnesty to senior LRA commanders even 
before the ICC referral, and the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2002, a product of Museveni’s insistence 
on a military victory against Kony, legally denied them amnesty (Allen 2008:74). Domestic 
                                                 
13 Indeed, this is not the only instance of self-referral. The ICC situation in the Ituri region of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo is commonly seen as similar to Museveni’s political strategy of ICC referral. DRC president 
Joseph Kabila referred the case only after his military campaign in eastern DRC was losing international support, 
and he used the ICC as to isolate his enemies and galvanize international pressure against them. The only two 
convictions secured by the ICC were a result of these investigations, and the referral directly contributed to the 
OTP’s ability to secure arrests and bring the cases to trial. 
95 
 
support for amnesty is widespread and the UPDF has generally been accepting of the process. 
However, ICC intervention has been perceived as undermining the domestic amnesty law as well 
as threatening to the prospect of peace in Northern Uganda. 
Amnesty is a domestic process that does not limit ICC warrants or investigations. Giving 
someone amnesty can be construed as an unwillingness to prosecute thereby allowing the ICC to 
intervene and indict anyone who had receive amnesty if it so chooses (Allen 2008:89). After the 
public announcement of the ICC referral, the LRA became increasingly reluctant to accept offers 
of amnesty in peace negotiations as genuine. Amnesty could not be guaranteed by the Ugandan 
government once it voluntarily offered itself to the Court, a calculation that President Museveni 
apparently did not consider before the referral. However, the ICC can just as easily allow 
domestic amnesty processes to continue alongside its investigations. Dividing the combatants 
between their level of responsibility allows the ICC to indict higher profile criminals while 
allowing for an amnesty process to deal with lower-ranking criminals if the government chooses 
(Schiff 2008:201). ICC admissibility criteria is case-specific, meaning an inability or 
unwillingness to prosecute is based on a particular crime, not across entire situation, and the OTP 
can justify its discretion over indictments accordingly (Ocampo 2006). President Museveni 
favored a division of responsibility in the amnesty process long before the ICC referral, but the 
danger many Ugandans feared was that the ICC would act without prejudice to the Ugandan 
domestic procedure and dictate its own conception of justice (Allen 2008:117). What happened 
instead was the ICC legitimated the official peace strategy and used its own legal admissibility 
criteria to do so. In the end, the UPDF had an even greater resolve to pursue its military strategy, 
the ICC got to issue its first warrants, and the Amnesty Act of 2000 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 
of 2002 were not affected. The Rome Statute’s restriction on indicting those most responsible 
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single-handedly allowed for this political compromise between the ICC and the Ugandan 
government. 
The amnesty process was part of a broader peace initiative to end the conflict, and the 
ICC represented an unpopular proposition of prioritizing prosecution over peace. The Ugandan 
government was spending large amounts of resources to enforce its IDP strategy, to support the 
Iron Fist Offensives, and secure international cooperation for its cross-border military operations. 
One of the motives for the referral was to catalyze international attention to the conflict and 
entice international and bilateral peacekeeping forces to intervene to assist the UPDF (Akhavan 
2005:410). If a peace negotiation could be secured and enforced to Museveni’s liking, then an 
escalation in international and Ugandan military efforts would not be necessary. Museveni has 
had a conflicting relationship with the peace efforts. Betty Bigombe insisted on securing a line of 
communication with Kony and the LRA throughout her tenure, but Museveni frequently 
undermined her position by pursuing the military option at his discretion. Likewise, the LRA had 
a reputation for breaking ceasefire agreements and arranging meetings with any senior member 
was dangerous and sometimes impossible. In early 2005, Bigombe’s key negotiator in the LRA 
was evacuated by the UPDF, destroying their line of contact with Kony (Allen 2008:81). After a 
round of negotiations fell through a few months later as a result, the UPDF reoccupied a 
previously agreed upon ceasefire zone leading to more LRA mutilations and military 
engagements (Allen 2008:82). Nevertheless, international and domestic will to support peace 
negotiations has remained strong. Acholi religious and civil society organizations, international 
peace envoys, and Bigombe’s governmental office had garnered a widespread resolve to keep the 
door open for negotiations, but many feared the ICC would destroy this process. Peace and 
justice represent two opposing sides of the same coin, the former a product of political 
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bargaining and the latter a normative valuation of accountability. The ICC places peace 
negotiations as the exception to the ideal of legal judgment, but in many ways it also protects the 
domestic political process. Although many perceived the ICC intervention has entirely 
inconsistent with peace negotiations, the Court in fact exercised a great deal of flexibility in 
allowing the domestic process to run its course, all the while reinforcing its normative resolve. 
The LRA engaged in peace talks not because it wanted to end its campaign but largely 
because it wanted to be taken seriously by the UPDF, and the ICC was not going to make Kony 
more sincere overnight. The LRA’s insistence upon impunity was coupled with demands for a 
good quality of life upon their return to Uganda (ICG 2005:1). LRA commanders wanted 
recognition of their threat to Museveni’s government, and their continued practice of establishing 
a ceasefire and breaking it soon after indicated that Kony was not willing to lay down arms for 
the sake of coexistence. The ICC complicated this situation by limiting what Kony could bargain 
for (Branch 2007:183). His impunity was no longer an option. Although the investigation could 
be suspended, the warrants cannot be totally withdrawn, and arguably he no longer has an 
incentive to end his campaign.  
However, Article 16 of the Rome Statute does allows for a twelve month deferral of the 
case by the UN Security Council if it thinks the investigations are directly contributing to 
international and domestic insecurity. Many Ugandans fear that if Kony is cornered even further 
he will withdraw from the peace process entirely and fight back even harder (ICG 2005:2). The 
reality, though, is the ICC intervention has prevented Kony from continuing his campaign in 
Northern Uganda out of fear of arrest (Schiff 2008:209). Due in part to the independence of 
South Sudan that denied Kony a safe haven for his operations in Uganda, he has retreated to 
Central Africa were international military forces continue to pursue him and the LRA. It is clear 
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that the ICC did not single-handedly damage Museveni’s peace strategy and instead reinforced 
support for the military option. This was a deliberate effort by the Court to negotiate its 
exceptional intervention around Museveni’s political parameters, thereby ensuring a working 
relationship with the central government and a mutually-beneficial judicial effort against the 
LRA. 
Nevertheless, there is a possibility for the Court to suspend its investigations indefinitely 
if the prosecutor determines that an investigation does not serve the ‘interests of justice.’ Under 
Article 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c), the prosecutor has the discretion to decide, subject to Pre-Trial 
review, whether not to proceed if the investigation does not serve the “interests of justice” (Rome 
Statute). The Court has clarified that this is different from the interests of peace, but the situation 
in Uganda makes this difference fairly ambiguous (Branch 2007:749). For one, this ability is 
explicitly a clause of exception. Only when the case does not serve the purposes of ‘ending 
impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern’ can a case be suspended, and it is 
possible the conflict in Northern Ugandan could deteriorate to a point where an ICC 
investigation is not conducive of a lasting respect towards international justice, especially if the 
ICC is the cause of further violence (ICC 2007:4). This is an issue of timing for the ICC, not 
impunity. The Prosecutor has defined his involvement around a calculated assessment of its 
effects and remains open to changing strategy in the event that it is deemed incommensurate with 
‘justice’ (Schiff 2008:204). The state of exception in Article 53 is evident as a means of recourse 
for the self-preservation of the ICC (Branch 2007:189). For example, arrest warrants for Kony 
and four other LRA commanders were under seal for almost a year. The ICC wanted to ensure 
that the warrants would not cause a worsening security situation within Uganda, and thus 
managed its approach according to the damage it might cause to its investigation in Uganda 
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(Brubacher 2010:274). This and other prosecutorial actions indicate that the Prosecutor 
understands his or her intervention as exceptional, manipulating his or her involvement around 
political threats to the investigation and ensuring a degree of flexibility in its actions (Olasolo 
2003:110). The ‘interest of justice’ clause is an extension of the exceptional nature of 
international criminal law’s intervention because the prosecutor decides what is necessary for the 
ICC’s broader juridical order and interprets the possibility of suspension in Article 53 according 
to its changing political context. 
What is clear in the ongoing negotiation of peace, amnesty, and international law in 
Northern Uganda is that each strategy is part of a multi-institutional compromise that involves 
competing interests and understandings of justice. The ICC has a particular set of interests 
concerning the wellbeing of itself and international legal intervention, and if it chose to invoke 
Article 53, its value in future situations would be tarnished. However, the Ugandan domestic 
context demands the Court consider its necessity and weigh it against the purpose of 
international legal intervention. Although it remains to be seen whether Article 53 will be used in 
Northern Uganda, the ICC’s investigative strategy of keeping a limited profile indicates that it 
has entertained the possibility. The Rome Statute allows for prosecutorial discretion in the 
preliminary investigative stages, and the OTP carefully exercised its legal powers in a 
conservative consideration for the political wellbeing of the Court and its investigation in 
Northern Uganda (Olasolo 2003:133). By limiting investigations to only those most responsible, 
a provision that will be discussed in more depth later, the amnesty process was allowed to remain 
intact and the military operation was able to continue on its current course. Furthermore, keeping 
the warrants under seal during ongoing peace negotiations allowed the UPDF to keep the 
appearance of being able to direct the ICC to the LRA’s liking (Allen 2008:173). Museveni has 
100 
 
claimed that he will withdraw the warrants if the peace negotiations are successful, and although 
he can persuade the prosecutor into suspending the investigation in the ‘interests of justice,’ this 
is a legal determination out of the hands of the Ugandan government (Allen 2008:94). Peace and 
amnesty processes were part of a broader normative debate over the value of international 
criminal law and its institutional authority, thus influencing how the ICC intervened in Uganda 
(Olasolo 2003:111).  
The nature of the LRA context is certainly not unusual in the grand scheme of mass 
atrocity, and it is likely that the ICC will take a similar prosecutorial strategy of negotiation, 
secrecy, and appeasement in the future. After all, the ICC was able to maintain its investigation 
and Museveni was able to pursue his political agenda each in concert with one another. Peace 
negotiations and amnesty in international criminal law are exceptional means of suspending ICC 
investigations, and international criminal law, although supreme in its authority when it does 
intervene, works through exceptional considerations of other conceptions of justice to preserve 
itself. What is more problematic is that the broad, value laden aspect of ensuring the protection 
of the ‘interests of justice’ explicitly allows for a political manipulation of the ICC’s juridical 
order (Olasolo 2003:142-143). This discretionary threshold determination has the possibility of 
being influenced by the ICC’s political interests in Uganda if the ICC’s investigations lose 
relevancy or political value. Although ensuring the prosecutor has a level of discretion in the 
Rome Statue allows the OTP to negotiate its involvement around the broad exceptional 
enterprise of international criminal law, the ICC has received harsh criticism for its conservative 
and cautious negotiation of the Northern Uganda situation. The UPDF IDP policy has directly 
harmed the lives of millions of Ugandans, and avoiding the issue was justified by the same legal 
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protections that allow the prosecutor to circumvent polarizing investigative actions in debates 
over peace, amnesty, and ‘the interests of justice.’ 
 
Gravity and the Ugandan People Defense Forces (UPDF) 
A determination of gravity is both relative and subjective. Something is grave and serious 
only in relation to other cases of a similar nature. Moreover, criminal gravity is a normative 
valuation. A crime is grave only because of the value system that determines it as extra-ordinary. 
Nothing is inherently grave or sinister but rather a crime is grave only in relation to a set of 
values. Because a determination of gravity is relative to its corresponding norms, it is a matter 
that is contingent on the subjective calculation of the person making this threshold decision. In a 
court of law, determining a crime of extreme relative severity is inherently problematic, 
especially when the admissibility of a case is contingent on its perceived gravity. The ICC 
determines gravity in two stages: first, in deciding whether a case as a whole constitutes a 
‘serious crime of international concern;’ and secondly, whether indictments are served for the 
most severe crimes within that case. The ICC’s intervention in Northern Uganda demonstrates 
that both determinations are influenced by the political context and the perceived notion of 
necessity for ICC prosecution. Just like the ICTR, the need for state cooperation and the Court’s 
weak political standing are the primary factors that influence whom the Court indicts and how it 
justifies its decisions. Once it became clear that the UPDF was not going to be subject to 
prosecution, the OTP justified this as a matter of gravity in relation to the crimes of the LRA. 
Although the Prosecutor paints this assessment as a matter strictly concerning the numbers of 
those affected and in what manner, the issue is more confounded once the Court’s principles as 
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an international seat of judgment, its mission to end impunity, and the values that influence 
criminal severity are taken into account. The ICC’s exceptional exercise of law is influenced by 
political limitations and realities, and in Uganda, this is especially pronounced in the issue of 
gravity. 
The OTP has sole discretion over the ICC’s gravity threshold in both the admissibility of 
situations and the relative gravity of the indictments (Olasolo 2003:89). Although the 
prosecutor’s discretionary decisions regarding gravity is subject to review by the Pre-Trial 
Chambers to open formal investigations, issue arrest warrants, and an admissibility appeal by the 
defense, the prosecutor’s decisions in initial investigations determine the involvement of the 
Court’s other organs. Before a formal investigation begins, the OTP decides the Court’s 
situations, selects possible indictments, and builds each case, all of which require “sufficient 
gravity” to proceed. In determining gravity, the OTP considers the scale of the crimes, their 
nature, their manner of commission, and their impact (ICC-OTP 2007:5). Placed in the context 
of the Court’s primary mission of “ending impunity for the most serious crimes of international 
concern,” the calculation between each of these four factors remains ambiguous and ill-defined 
(Schabas 2008:718). For example, although the number of casualties might be the principal 
concern in this determination, the nature of their commission could be more exceptional to 
customary international norms. If the prosecutor had to hypothetically choose between 
prosecuting a rebel movement that has conscripted large number of child soldiers or a 
government that has indiscriminately killed civilians in lesser numbers, whether or not the 
conscription of child soldiers is a more serious crime remains debatable in an international court. 
The rationale for a gravity threshold, though, is the ICC’s resource constraint (Schabas 
2008:740). The ICC is financed by the UN and government donors, and similar to the ad-hoc 
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tribunals, the Court’s finances, its staff, and its political weakness limit its investigations to the 
most pressing cases. The ICC is also mandated to investigate numerous situations each with their 
own indictments, making it impractical to consider all possible crimes in the ICC’s subject 
matter jurisdiction (ICC-OTP 2003:3). However, this constraint leads to a value assessment of 
the priorities of the Court in which cases are more serious, are of a greater international concern, 
and which would be most effective at adjudicating (Olasolo 2003:106-107). Accordingly, the 
Prosecutor is made out to be a de facto policy maker. By deciding where to intervene and its 
value to the cause of international justice, the Prosecutor decides the mission of the Court as a 
whole – an inherently political decision (Olasolo 2003:141). 
In Northern Uganda, the two sides under investigation are of a drastically different nature 
and have committed drastically different atrocities. The LRA’s terror campaign has physically 
harmed the lives of thousands of women, children, and innocent Ugandans, yet the UPDF’s 
forcible transfer of millions of Northern Ugandans has contributed more towards rising mortality 
rates, insecurity, and fear. However, the disparity between the two actors pose a problem for the 
Court’s purpose as an international court of law. The LRA are undoubtedly the group that have 
committed more direct physical harm on the Ugandan population, but it was likely that without 
the ICC they would have still faced punitive action from the Ugandan state. The conflict between 
the LRA and the UPDF had been ongoing for almost twenty years before the ICC intervened, 
and there was a concerted effort to bring Kony and the LRA to trial long before the referral 
(Allen 2008:83). The UPDF, though, faced no punitive threat. The IDP policy of Operation 
North was unchallenged by the domestic judiciary, and the ICC was the only Court that could 
have exercised jurisdiction over the government and brought this policy under scrutiny. The 
purpose of a court of last resort is weighed against the political climate of impunity throughout 
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the Rome Statute, and mitigating the risk of impunity is both the purpose for the ICC’s founding 
and a justification for its exceptional intervention. In Uganda, the UPDF was the main actor who 
was bound to go unpunished without an ICC investigation for committing a crime against 
international humanitarian law, yet the OTP decided to not issue arrest warrants for the UPDF. 
However, because the ICC investigation in Uganda was justified through the exceptional nature 
of LRA atrocities, the Prosecutor’s politically advantageous selective prosecution was within the 
statutory law of the ICC. 
In a Pre-Trial decision in the ICC’s first ever trial against Thomas Lubanga in its 
situation in the DRC, the Chambers cited the position of the accused as a relevant consideration 
to the gravity of the case. It argued that if the accused is in a position of leadership it is he who is 
best in a position to prevent the commission of the crime and enforce accountability (Schabas 
2008:741-745). Naturally, the state assumes this position under international standards of 
national sovereignty – a notion upon which the ICC validates by virtue of its principle of 
complementarity. It follows, then, that leaving an individual in a leadership position within the 
state immune from prosecution poses a risk for the ICC’s mandated objective to end impunity 
and ensure universal accountability for violations of international criminal law (Branch 745-
746). Although the crime that the UPDF allegedly orchestrated does not match the brutality 
characteristic of the LRA, the forcible transfer of populations could still be considered grave 
under the ICC’s own conception of the term by virtue of its state sponsored nature and the 
inevitable impunity that will result without international prosecution (ICC-OTP 2003:7). In 
issuing arrest warrants for only the LRA, the ICC merely made itself a surrogate of the Ugandan 
state rather than an independent court of last resort that ensures accountability for crimes that 
would otherwise go unpunished. 
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However, the Court’s understanding of gravity is based in exception and thus allows for a 
politically expedient flexibility in its application. The prosecutor has full discretion over the 
decision on where to investigate and who to indict, and because gravity is a relative concept, the 
Prosecutor’s political position at the time of his or her decision greatly influences this 
determination. For example, at the time of the investigations in Northern Uganda there was no 
other assessment of gravity within the Court to refer back to (Branch 2007:743). Instead, the 
determination of gravity was comparing the LRA to the UPDF, two different circumstances of 
the same conflict that invoked two different yet complementary conceptions of gravity. Although 
the former committed infamous atrocities that struck to the core of basic international human 
rights, the latter invoked the founding principles of ICC and universal jurisdiction. Both crimes 
are serious in the international legal conscience for different reasons and can be evaluated by 
objective criteria (Brubacher 2010:269). Arguably, it is the UPDF who should primarily be 
subject to international legal scrutiny because without the ICC, those responsible for forcibly 
transferring hundreds of thousands of Ugandans into deplorable IDP camps would go 
unpunished. However, if the ICC were to indict members of the UPDF then it would risk its 
coveted political position with the Ugandan government. Demonstrated by the experiences of the 
ad-hoc tribunals, particularly the ICTR, state cooperation is negotiable, and international legal 
institutions do not have a political authority in isolation. They are part of a broader geopolitical 
context, and the ICC is especially subject to changes in political will because of its foundations 
in treaty law. States can withdraw from it at a moment’s notice, not to mention its isolation from 
the United Nations due to vocal opposition from three permanent members of the Security 
Council. If the Court indicted members of the Ugandan state on its first investigation, its political 
support from the UN and state parties would inevitably diminish. The ICC had not yet 
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demonstrated its effectiveness or political value at the time of the initial investigation in Northern 
Uganda, and to maintain its investigation the OTP used the gravity threshold to justify a 
politically expedient decision in keeping the UPDF out of the dock. 
The Rome Statute mandates the determination of “sufficient gravity” in numerous articles 
yet never clarifies how to understand the term or what to prioritize. If the OTP wanted to protect 
the ICC’s judicial impartiality and demonstrate its capacity to investigate crimes that would 
otherwise go unpunished, then indicting the UPDF would be a valuable contribution to the ICC’s 
mandate to end impunity. However, many pragmatic considerations have instead led the OTP to 
avoid making this decision. One, a case against the UPDF would have been difficult to 
investigate and prove in a court of law (Allen 2008:98). State cooperation could have been 
withheld and it would have been unlikely that the Security Council would coerce Museveni into 
cooperation. Indicting the LRA would be more feasible as well as valuable for the Court’s 
political image. Second, those most responsible for the IDP strategy were in positions of 
authority in the Ugandan government. Indicting a member of the Ugandan state would have 
polarized support for the ICC in its ongoing investigation in the DRC, also referred by the state. 
To preserve the ICC’s legal order from political subversion, the OTP limited indictments to the 
LRA, justifying this decision through the legally mandated threshold of “sufficient gravity.” 
In this instance, the exceptional foundation of international criminal law allowed for an 
expedient political choice from the Prosecutor. The gravity threshold is the largest discretionary 
power the prosecutor has in selectively prosecuting cases that pose the greatest amount of risk. 
As in the case of the ICTR, the issue of gravity is often framed as a constraint on discretion, but 
as demonstrated here and in the previous chapter, restrictions and a perceived necessity allow for 
a pragmatic negotiation between competing values, interests, and decisions (Olasolo 2003:136). 
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The appearance of ICC independence would have been greatly served by a UPDF indictment, 
but the costs the Court and the OTP would have incurred in its investigative support would have 
been great enough to render the ICC irrelevant before it brought a case to trial. In making a 
decision on which case is of the most international concern, the prosecutor can use law to make 
an extralegal judgment on whether to “tolerate the virus of impunity, once it has been detected in 
a given situation of crisis” (Olasolo 2003:149). However, the Prosecutor’s control over the 
investigation is constrained. External actors in the case of Uganda (i.e. the government and the 
UN) can force the prosecutor’s hand into a pragmatic political choice. After all, the ICC has 
enormous hopes riding on its future as the sole authority for international justice and human 
rights law (Arsanjani and Reisman 2005:403). In intervening in ongoing conflicts like in 
Northern Ugandan, various political powers continue to reestablish control and assert each 
individual interest, and the ICC is only one of many competing agendas, albeit one contingent on 
the political will of other institutions and lacking actionable results (Arsanjani and Reisman 
2005:385). The Court has an interest in demonstrating its efficiency where it can without 
damaging its support in the future by making ambitious yet legally rational decisions. In 
prioritizing the preservation of the enterprise of international criminal law as a whole, the notion 
of gravity was an extension of the exceptional logic of ICC intervention. It is clear that the 
ambiguous conception of gravity as a legal concept of admissibility can be appropriated to 
expedient and politically advantageous ends, and the prosecutor has the power to interpret these 
ends. The exception of gravity, then, is folded back upon the norm. By deciding what case 
justifies the exceptional attention of the ICC, the Prosecutor decides the Court’s acting values. 
Gravity, after all, is the rationale that validates the intervention of the Court in the first place, and 
in declaring when this exception is warranted the prosecutor ultimately decides the norms 
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through which the Court operates. In Northern Uganda, these norms were weighted heavily 
towards political manipulation and legal pragmatism. 
 
Local Justice 
The phrase “in the interests of justice” begs the question: whose justice? The Rome 
Statute is an expression of the commitment to international legalism that is ultimately limited by 
political compromise. International legal institutions threaten the political community of nation-
states, and as a product of treaty law, the letter of law of in the Rome Statute is inscribed and 
drafted through the lens of politics. Complementarity is one such compromise. International 
justice in the form of the ICC is forced to take into account national priorities through this 
principle. Justice has a broad and multi-faceted understanding, and the ICC and international 
criminal law in general represents only one understanding of justice – retributive. The phrase 
“interests of justice” does not delineate between retributive and restorative conceptions, the latter 
being based in the rehabilitation of social relationships rather than punitive action. The question 
of what form of justice is in the interest of the ICC is particularly pronounced in the situation in 
Northern Uganda. The issues of peace, amnesty, and reconciliation are confounded in a supposed 
understanding of justice of the victimized Acholi people, and the ICC is mandated to take into 
account domestic procedure. In Northern Uganda, the political limits of the Court force it to 
confront its political opposition, transitional justice paradigms, and non-profit advocacy in 
negotiation of international legalism. Although restorative and retributive justice can be 
complementary to one another, the ICC aims to enforce international human rights discourse in 
at its very foundation. Those that advocate for local justice mechanisms in Northern Uganda as 
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an alternative to international legalism, though, are especially influential given the Court’s 
political weakness and complementarity concern for domestic procedure (Akhavan 2005:409). 
The Rome Statute protects the possibility of making an exception to local conceptions of justice, 
and the OTP in Uganda is engaging in an ongoing valuation of the Court’s intervention in the 
social context of Northern Uganda vis-à-vis the legitimacy of Acholi justice mechanisms. 
Although fully yielding to local restorative justice is incommensurate with the retributive 
principles the ICC is designed to apply, the prosecutor’s investigation demonstrated a pragmatic 
concern with Acholi custom opening up the possibility of an exceptional suspension of 
international law. Article 53 is a measure of exception by the Prosecutor’s own admission, and it 
is apparent that the OTP is debating the legitimacy of Acholi justice mechanisms and whether 
they pass the threshold determination of affecting the ICC’s founding norms and principles. 
Restorative justice is not a new concept in human rights discourse. In Rwanda, for 
example, a village based court system called gacaca that was based around communal discussion 
and social restoration was implemented by the Rwandan government to deal with the large 
number of genocide cases in 2002. Gacaca represented the alternative to judicial arbitration in 
Rwanda, and thus international and domestic civil society rallied behind its cause. It was an 
efficient way of dealing with the enormous caseload, implementing a decentralized policy that 
involved the participation of the entire population, and, most importantly, applying a process 
ostensibly rooted in tradition, history and cultural practice. Although the gacaca courts were not 
the first demand for a local ownership of transitional justice, they were arguably the most 
successful and viable alternative to international legal mechanisms. Its legacy continued in 
international human rights organizations as an example of how international law can organized 
to serve the wishes of those most affected. So when the ICC intervened in another African nation 
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under the auspices of international law in 2004, the Acholi culture provided a proper outlet to 
oppose the international legal enterprise at its foundation. 
In Northern Uganda, the idea of an Acholi population group is a product of colonial 
administration. Reconciliation, forgiveness, and amnesty are common understandings across 
Africa, and Uganda is no different (Allen 2008:162). The Acholi people were the most affected 
by the LRA insurgency, and over the course of the almost twenty year conflict, community 
reintegration of returning rebels through a process of forgiveness and reconciliation were 
common practices. However, it was not until the possibility of international legal intervention 
that this practice was appropriated as local justice, and an Acholi ritual called mato oput was 
proclaimed by international sources as its primary expression. Literally meaning “the bitter root,” 
mato oput involves sharing a drink made of a bitter root between a perpetrator and his or her 
victim. The historic use of this ritual is an established fact, but what is questionable is whether 
this ritual is widely understood as a common practice by all Acholi or whether the ritual is meant 
to deal with acts that characterize the LRA and the reintegration of former rebels (Allen 165). 
However, non-governmental organizations, human rights groups, and those who oppose 
international criminal law in general were quick to use the Acholi practice of repatriation and the 
limited use of mato oput as an example of an alternative way means of justice against the 
mounting ICC investigation (Allen 2010:244-245). 
What is more suspect is the question of who can claim to be an authority for the Acholi 
population. Acholi “chiefs” were the product of the colonial administration but continued under 
the Ugandan state because of their utility in domestic governance (Allen 2010:253). When the 
ICC investigation began, these chiefs claimed a position of authority in matters of local justice, 
and the ICC willingly accepted this authority in their consultations with them (Branch 2007:192). 
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A group of Acholi representatives, chiefs, and religious officials traveled to the ICC to voice to 
the prosecutor their concerns with the ICC investigation and advocate in favor of Acholi ritual 
practices. This meeting produced a series of problems for the ICC. One, the Acholi are not the 
only ones affected by the LRA, and presenting the Acholi viewpoint as the authority in Northern 
Uganda risks fragmenting the domestic ethnic landscape (Allen 2008:178). Although the ICC 
consulted with a more diverse group of local leaders months later, the appearances of serving 
Acholi interests over others in the south and across the north has negatively affected the Court’s 
domestic image. Secondly, the chiefs and self-proclaimed representatives do not share the 
opinion of the majority of the population they supposedly represent. Survey evidence indicates a 
greater Ugandan demand for retributive methods than these leaders let on (Allen 2008:147-148). 
Further ethnographic evidence complicates the Acholi and Northern Ugandan idea of 
justice as representative of Acholi social practice as a whole. Recent survey evidence indicates 
that Northern Ugandans agree with the ICC that LRA commanders should be prosecuted and 
local reconciliation should be fostered at the same time (Allen 2008:147). Contrary to 
international media reports (New York Times 2005) and advocacy groups, popular Acholi 
notions of justice are no different than the ICC practice of punishing those most responsible and 
allowing the rest to be dealt with in domestic procedure (Allen 2010:250). Moreover, the moto 
oput ritual is known to mean very little to those accepting amnesty. In an interview with a 
returning LRA officer, on anthropologist described a situation where a former rebel openly 
mocked the suggestion that the ritual would affect how he is viewed in his community (Allen 
2008:166). The TV cameras, reporters, and amount press that surround these rituals, however, 
suggest that various external actors took the opportunity to appropriate a rare, isolated 
community practice in opposition to the ICC. 
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Those advocating for a local command over the arbitration of the twenty year LRA 
conflict clearly understood the exceptions the Rome Statute allowed. The justice implied in the 
phrase “interests of justice” is intentionally broad to maintain a degree of flexibility in deciding 
an exception to the ideal of international prosecution, but it remains to be seen whether the Court 
decides that the popularized and questionably universal Acholi practice of justice warrants a 
suspension of international legalism. Until the defendants and victims appear in court, the 
prosecutor effectively decides legitimate forms of local justice in Uganda and whether they are 
incommensurate with the Rome Statute through Article 53(2)(c) (Schiff 2008:203). Acholi 
“justice” may not be the historic or universally accepted restorative mechanism that the drafters 
of the Rome Statute had in mind (Allen 2008:162), but the uncertainty that followed the first 
official ICC investigation required that the prosecutor be cautious and consider all factors and 
interests or else politically isolate the institution as another form of international imperialism. In 
listening to Acholi demands, the prosecutor established protections for suspending its 
investigations in the Rome Statute as a sincere possibility, but the legitimacy of these 
popularized practices and their relationship to the Rome Statute’s conception of “justice” must 
first be determined. The LRA has been utilizing the human rights discourse on traditional justice 
themselves to negotiate a settlement with the ICC, but most returning rebels either never perform 
the rituals or do not find it meaningful (Allen 2010:258). Warrants were issued despite many 
chiefs and leaders who argued otherwise, but there remains the possibility of suspending them if 
the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chambers decides Acholi restorative justice is legitimate and concerns the 
application of international criminal law (ICC-OTP 2007:9).  
Human rights and international legalism wer the main impetus for the Court’s creation, 
but the compromises enumerated in the Rome Statute demanded the ICC negotiate its 
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intervention proactively against local and state interests. The debate on when the “interests of 
justice” are at stake is a subjective determination of exception based on what those interests are, 
what justice entails, and when it is threatened, all of which have little objective basis and have 
yet to be put into jurisprudence by the ICC. Acholi ‘justice’ will still be debated on its merits 
within this framework throughout the ICC’s investigation, and it is up to the Prosecutor or the 
Pre-Trial Chambers to make the threshold determination of when the exception enumerated in 
Article 53 applies in the reality of Northern Uganda. “The interests of justice” is a deliberately 
broad phrase to allow for the myriad local contexts the ICC is bound to encounter, but what is 
demonstrated in the case of Northern Uganda is that it is s complex subjective calculation of 
exception protected by law contingent on a dynamic and contentious political environment. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Borrowing from Italian political theorist Giorgio Balladore-Palleiri, Giorgio Agamben 
maintains that, in relation to deciding the exception, 
“the recourse to necessity entails a moral or political (or, in any case, extrajuridical) 
evaluation, by which the juridical order is judged and is held to be worthy of preservation 
or strengthening even at the price of its possible violation. For this reason, the principle 
of necessity is, in every case, always a revolutionary principle (Agamben 2005:30). 
 
In international criminal law, the revolutionary exercise of redefining the juridical order’s 
boundaries is evident in throughout the entire enterprise. From the creation of the institution to 
its intervention and the suspension of national sovereignty all the way down to the legal 
decisions that are made within the exceptional framework, international criminal law creates new 
sites, methods, and means of juridical regulation. The cases of the ICTR in Rwanda and the ICC 
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situation in Northern Uganda demonstrate that not only is the justification for each institution’s 
involvement exceptional “crimes” against a universal moral conscience, but also that as each 
institution encounters its limits, the application and interpretation of statutory laws are molded 
around the exception they represent. Because international criminal law is exceptional at its very 
foundation, the letter of the law is embedded and defined by its exceptional existence. Both the 
ICTR and the ICC are adjudicating law in “uncharted waters,” but despite the uncertainties, the 
waters are “uncharted” because they are beyond the normal state of affairs. Each institution 
applies law in order to preserve it as well as expand it, and their exceptional foundation, in 
Balladore-Palleiri’s terms, is for the “preservation or strengthening” of the juridical norm each 
court of law represents. 
To be sure, the ICTR and the ICC are very different types of courts with a different 
political and legal representation. The ICTR is a child of the failure of UN human rights 
discourse, and because of this, the exceptional exercise of law the ICTR acts within is one that 
aims to preserve, strengthen, and maintain the interests of an institution outside of itself. 
However, to achieve this mandate, the preservation of the ICTR was a key consideration. 
Criminal tribunals are but one of many possible ways to respond to an exceptional infringement 
on human dignity, and the ICTR was mandated to preserve the validity of international criminal 
law as well as the sanctity of international governance in general. On the other hand, the ICC is 
an entirely independent standing judicial body with no governing authority. Nevertheless, its 
statutory laws are created by political compromise. The Rome Statute protects, enumerates, and 
requires calculations of exception throughout, many of which allow for the suspension of the 
Court’s intervention in favor of a competing set of interests. ICC intervention is exceptional as 
well as governed by the possibility of its own suspension if it is deemed necessary. What 
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separates the ICTR from the ICC is that the permanent ICC replaces the need for an ad-hoc 
tribunal, in essence creating a new juridical order of international criminal law that is self-
sustaining. Nonetheless, the exception, the sovereign calculation of necessity, and the ability to 
decide when an exception exists are integral aspects of the judicial functions of both courts. 
The conceptual problem of gravity is fundamental to numerous determinations each court 
makes, and as argued above, it is a threshold determination of exception that is prone to political 
manipulation. The ICC is a court constrained by the conception of gravity at every investigative 
level, and although the laws governing case admissibility are meant to prevent politically 
motivated investigations, gravity is a calculation of exception that is open to the subjective 
determination of the Prosecutor and as such influenced by the political context. Both the ICTR 
and the ICC have the discretion to decide whom to indict based on the relative gravity of each 
case, but this determination directly implicates the primary exercise of exception inherent in 
international criminal law and its perceived necessity. The calculative necessity for an exception 
is integral in first deciding it, and issuing a determination of gravity that necessitates 
international legal intervention puts the underlying values of international criminal law at stake. 
The nature of the crime, who authored it, his or her position of authority, and the scale of the 
crime are all relevant determinations genuinely debated by each institution, but in deciding each 
factor’s relevant importance in a case both courts make a value judgment on why an indictment 
is necessary. Both courts legally require this cost-benefit valuation, but because the exceptional 
intervention of international criminal law is on the line, legal statutes that allow for this 
exceptional calculation are often manipulated to preserve the juridical order at stake or 
strengthen it for the future. Whether it is avoiding potentially divisive indictments against the 
RPF or UPDF or securing a reliable line of cooperation with the Ugandan or Rwandan 
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government, fluid determinations of necessity allow for a manipulation of the legal exception of 
gravity. 
Thus, the law that is applied in international legal institutions is maintained, interpreted, 
and manipulated vis-à-vis the exceptional project of international criminal law. The necessity in 
applying the law is a product of judging a factual situation and applying a set of legal premises to 
it. In international criminal law, the letter of the law is applied within its exceptional 
intervention. Given that positive law is removed from its application, the question of who 
decides law becomes all the more important. In Carl Schmitt’s words, “the necessity of judging a 
concrete fact concretely even though what is given as a standard for the judgment is only a legal 
principle in its general universality” demands that those in a position of authority to decide law’s 
application put the generalized “legal idea” into the context of the “concrete” (Schmitt 2005: 31). 
Because international criminal law is inherently exceptional, the context of law is already 
politically influenced, and international legal institutions judge the factual event from its position 
of exception. The ICTR’s confused battle over the application of Geneva Conventions best 
exemplifies this point. The Rwandan genocide was deemed a ‘genocide’ before the tribunal 
issued its first verdict, and its jurisprudence had to be manipulated around this foregone 
conclusion. After all, its mandate was to adjudicate the exceptional occurrence of genocide and if 
law could not do this, it should be judged inadequate and interpreted differently. International 
legal institutions politically benefit by appearing effective, and both the ICTR and the ICC 
interpret their statutory laws to best allow for the greatest amount of justice possible. Through 
avoiding controversial cases to interpreting ambiguous concepts in politically prudential ways, 




However, each institution’s sovereign authority over its decisions is ambiguous and 
contested. The ICTR, for example, is governed by the UN’s financial and political patronage, 
and the mandated completion strategy demonstrated that the tribunal operations were not solely 
under the ICTR’s control. Although the ICTR had ownership over how the completion strategy 
was implemented, the UN could directly affect the form of its intervention and thus change the 
nature of exception. The ICC was similarly embattled with the Ugandan government and Acholi 
civil society. Uganda is a voluntary party to the ICC’s legal mandate and as such can withdraw 
its cooperation at any time with little political risk. State referrals are a coveted means of 
intervention by the ICC because they allow the Court to operate at little to no political cost, and 
the Ugandan government’s political superiority managed to shield the UPDF and protect its 
amnesty process while the ICC benefitted from appearing to exercise justice against the LRA. 
Furthermore, the extent to which Acholi “justice,” as it is publically presented, is a viable outlet 
for victims to address their grievances is debatable, but a combination of the ICC’s waning 
domestic support and ambiguous jurisprudence forced the ICC into debating the possibility of its 
suspension allowed for in Article 53. In both courts, deciding when the exceptional intervention 
of international criminal law is valid is part of their authority, but that decision is also influenced, 
negotiated, and manipulated by external actors that affect the defined necessity for exception. 
The theory of the state of exception has a negative connotation in contemporary political 
discourse. Instances of martial law, states of emergency, and civil unrest are frequently used as 
the legal pretext behind repressive governing strategies. In Agamben’s words, through the state 
of exception, “the normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with 
impunity by a governmental violence that…nevertheless still claims to by applying the law” 
(Agamben 2005:87). However, when law is inherently exceptional, as is international criminal 
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law, its intervention is always subject to manipulation and changing valuations of its normative 
use. As discussed previously, the state of exception “has a decisive strategic relevance for the 
juridical order” in preserving it or strengthening it through its suspension, and international 
criminal law’s exceptional intervention maintains this exact relationship to the international 
human rights discourse (Agamben 2005:51). International courts like the ICTR and the ICC are 
the enforcement mechanism for an otherwise toothless ethical system, and international criminal 
law is utilized as a means to galvanize respect for this code in exceptional instances. 
Nevertheless, when international criminal law does not benefit universal human rights, it does 
not intervene. Thus, exceptional international legal interventions are contingent on the level of 
respect for universal human rights worldwide. International legal institutions are but one way to 
enforce, protect, and preserve the human rights doctrine, and because they are exceptional means 
of recourse, their existence is reliant on their perceived necessity in pursuing this objective. It is 
possible that the demand for ICC intervention will only increase as international criminal law’s 
perceived value in preserving international order rises, but it is also possible that this perceived 
value will diminish as well. The philosophical foundation of the state of exception helps explain, 
evaluate, and understand international criminal law’s changing position in the broader 
geopolitical order. The global normative value for universal human rights, the calculated 
necessity for the suspension of the norm of national sovereignty, and international criminal law’s 
value in ensuring the reestablishment of law and order are all empirical questions within the 
framework of the state of exception. As demonstrated through the case studies presented above, 
the theory can be instrumental in critical examinations of how international criminal law operates 
in its surrounding context within international legal institutions. Moreover, the state of 
exception’s implications are not relegated to state governance, and utilizing this theory in new 
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sites of application expands generalized understandings of sovereign power, necessity, and 
exception. 
Returning to the Hannah Arendt quote that inaugurated this project, Adolf Eichmann’s 
trial in Jerusalem was a means for the state of Israel to take ownership in overcoming the 
suffering of the Jewish people, but the Jews Eichmann deported to Nazi concentration camps 
were only one aspect of a broader moral order that Eichmann’s existence threatened. Eichmann, 
The Hutu Power genocidaires of Rwanda, and the Lord’s Resistance Army did not aim to 
decapitate human dignity nor did they target its destruction as their main objective, but the acts 
of violence they commissioned nevertheless threatened its sanctity. Although the victims belong 
to a particular group of people, the law that was infringed upon transcends human communities. 
They are seen as an exception to human criminality, a type of wrongdoer whose very existence is 
a subject of universal human revulsion that unites people in common purpose (Feldman and 
Ticktin 2010:14-15). These perpetrators require humanity as a whole to sit in judgment, and it is 
this exceptional calculation that defines international criminal law. The ICTR and the ICC 
situation in Northern Uganda are justified by the exceptional scale of human suffering 
characteristic of the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in Northern Uganda respectively, but 
applying the law within an exception is a difficult conceptual problem that often precipitates its 
own demise. It is precisely that international criminal law is the exception that the rule of law is 
allowed to be manipulated, and the ICTR and the ICC investigation in Northern Uganda are only 
two examples of a larger paradigm that requires further attention. Although Arendt may have a 
point in arguing for the legitimacy of international criminal law over that of nation-states, the law 
championed by international courts is ultimately embedded in a complex state of exception that 
manipulates an ideally universal and impartial positive law around a politically contentious, 
120 
 
dynamic, and expansive context. Nonetheless, until violations of basic human rights are non-
existent or become unexceptional, international criminal law will remain an imperfect institution 
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